Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

8-1972

The Nixon "shocks": implications for Japan's foreign
policy in the 1970's
Richard Douglas Partch
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the American Politics Commons, International Relations Commons, and the United States
History Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Partch, Richard Douglas, "The Nixon "shocks": implications for Japan's foreign policy in the 1970's" (1972).
Dissertations and Theses. Paper 1574.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1573

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

AN ABSTRACT

O~'

THE THESIS' OF Richard Douglas Partch

for the Master of Arts in ~olitical Science presented

on August 10. 1972.
Title: The Nixon "Shocks": Imp'l"l'cations for Japan's
Foreign Policy in the 1970's.
APPROVED BY MEMBi'.RS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Dr. Ladis K.D. Kristof,
Dr. Bernard

~I'his

V.

Chairman

Burke

thesis examines the i;n.plications that the

Nixon .. shocks" may have on JapEill' s foreign policy.
The data used consisted of books, articles, periodicals.

goVeTILment publications and newspapers.

Examined were

such important factors as: tt.e attitudes of the political
parties in Japan on foreign policy questions, the rapid
rise of the Japanese economy and the iElplications this

has had on Japan's relations with other countries, and

the question of Japan's possible remilitarization,
buth in conventional ond nuclear terms.

In addition,

Japan's relations with the other three Great Powers
in Asia, (China, the Soviet Union and the United States),
are also studied.

From about 1945 until the close of

the 1960's, Japan's foreign policy had been based on
a close relationship with the United States.
about the end of 1970 to tl'J.e end of 1971,

From

Jap~n

was

stung by a series of "shocks" in t11e Course of Ai'nerican
foreign policy.

These included tile sudden and last

minute announcemen"t of Nixon's visit to qhina, severe
economic measures. the imposition of' textile quotas,
and the failure of Japan's co-sponsoring of the United
Nations motion

allowin.~;

Taiwan to keep its membership.

The period' of 1969 to 1972 is critical to the
future alignment of
clusion from this

Ja~an's

foreign policy.

re-ali~noent

One con

is that it is now clear

that Japan will no longsr serve as the American junior
partner in Asia.

Japan now shows a new independent

attitude in its relations with other countries, quite
apart from American desire.

Also in 1972 following

the Nixon "shocks," both China and the Soviet Union
competed against t:'le other to draw Japan aVlay from its

American alliance.

It is the shift in Japan's foreign
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The years 1968 and 1969 saw the first important
signs of what was soon to become a significant shift in
American global foreign policy.

Stemming from the un

popularity of American policy in Vietnam, the effects
of this shift, as enumerated in the so-called Nixon
doctrine of 1969, were to be most dramatically felt in
Asia.

The concentration of this paper will deal with

the reaction that has come from Japan: the country which
President Nixon has repeatedly called "America's most
important ally in Asia.

il

The central thesis of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia
is that:
The United States will participate in the
defense and development of its allies and
friends, but that America cannot -- and
will not -- conceive all the plans, design
all the programs, execute all the decisions
and undertake all the defense of the free
nations in the-w0rld. We will help where
it makes a real difference and is consid
ered in our interest. l
The American goals in Asia are

fcr~a

community of free

lRichard Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970's, A New Strategy for Peace: A Report to the
Congress," on February 18, 1970. The Department of
State Bulletin, Vol. LXII, no. l60~March 9, 1970),
p. 276.

2

nations able to go their own way and seek their own

destiny with whatever cooperation we can provide -- a
community of independent Asian countries developing
through mutual cooperation."1%' I~~~'ritics of the
Nixon doctrine would contend that as the United states
reduced its commitments in Asia, a somewhat proportional
reduction in its security would follow.
It is a basic assumption of this paper that as
the United States moved to reduce its political, mili
tary and economic power in Asia, it concurrently would
take two other actions designed to accompany and supple
ment that move.

First, the United States would parti

cipatein a general "detente" in Asia (and elsewhere in
the world), tending to reduce the "need" of American
power.

Second, _,the United States would begin to maneu

ver Japan into a position of assuming greater political
I

and military responsibility in Asia's future.
In contrast to the above, President Nixon on
February 9, 1972, detailed for the United States
congress{P exactly what he expected (or hoped) the Nixon
211A Statement by the President at Bangkok,
Thailand, on July 28, 1969," ibid., p. 293.
3Richard Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970's, The Emerging Structure of Peace: A Report to
t.he Congress," on February 9, 1972, The Department of
State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, no. 1707 (M.arch 3, 1972),
pp. 313-418.

3

doctrine would mean for Japan and the other countries
of Asia.

In his first poi.nt Nixcn claimed that, as a

result of his meeting with Japan's Prime Minister
Eisaku Sate at San Clemente

i~

January of 1972,

Japanese-American relations were strengthened.

In

reality, however, American-Japanese relations following
San Clemente were not strengthened.

Rather, the meet

ing by the two heads of state produced little more than
only a partial impediment to the continued worsening
and weakening of the ties between the two Pacific
powers.
A second point made by Nixon in his message to
Congress was that the United States would regard a
larger Japanese role in the economic and
fairs of

Asia~ot

po1~tica1

af

as a substitute for or interference

with our role, but as natural, necessary and p~oper."4
This statement also fails to be consistent with Asian
realities.

What in fact the United States was attempt

ing to accomplish in Asia was to push Japan into assum
ing greater political and military responsibilities.
In addition, it seems questionable to assume that the
UniteQ States would be content with, or would find
"natural, necessary and proper," Japan's continued
42£. cit., p. 317.

4

economic expansion in Asia, (or in the world).
out the Nixon

administratio~

Through

{1969 to mid-1972}, the

official emphasis was on the attempt to stabilize the
Japanese economic penetration of, and competition in,
~erican

markets.

It was during this period that the

~

cries of American businessmen could be heard,

~lamor~nq

for government protection for their respec

tive goods.

In short, any increase in Japan's Asian

political influence came largely at the expense of the
United States.
Given the definite limitations of American power,
Nixon's strategy became an attempt to allow for, and
even to push, Japan along a more independent route.
Japan was believed to be the best alternative to the
American decline {of both ability and ambition} in
Asia.

Second, if Japan assumed part of the financial

defense burden of nfree n Asia, not only \'lould American
military expenses decline, but so in part would Japan's
competitive economic resources.

Since Japan had pre

viously pressed the advantage of penetrating American
markets, why should the U.s. continue footing the
defense bills?
One must also question the third point made by
President Nixon in his message to Congress.

Therein

Nixon stated that the recent American initiative aimed

5

at the People's Republic of China~ was' Lconsistent with
the continuity of the

ship.~

clos~ U~S.-Japanese

relation

In fact, however, the President knew well in

advance that any such

American-Chinese-~rapprochement
(,

'

could be achieved only with the

~ost

partially being

borne in the goodwill of American-Japanese relations.
Part of this payment would come "naturally" as a result
of the shift in the Asian balance in power.

This was

largely because any decrease in American-Chinese ani
mosity would somewhat proportionally reduce the very
basis of needs in the U.S.-Japanese treaty system.
U.S.-China

.xapproch'ement~,

in this sense,

sign~led

The
an end

to the American Cold War policy of attempting to con
tain China on all fronts.

Indeed, many Japanese would

fear that, following the Nixon visit to Peking, they had
been left in the Cold War lurch with a government too
tired and too inflexible to meet the challenges of a
suddenly cold and distant world.
This lIunnaturalli shock as an element in the U.S.
China rapprochement, came with the "methods" used in the
initiative.

Having informed "America's most important

SIn reference to the term "China," it will be
meant mainland China (the People's Republic of China).
Any reference to "Nationalist China" will be so
specified or referred to as Taiwan.
6 Ibid •

6

ally in Asia" only minutes beforehand, Nixon made

Japan's Prime Minister Sato appear a fool in the eyes
of the Japanese people and the people of the world.

By

abandoning the policy that the United States and Japan
~

had shared for over a quarter of a century without
having either consulted or even informed its Asian ally
beforehand, the United States left the government of
Japan holding the Cold War bag.
A fourth point stressed by President Nixon in his
message to Congress found him on solid ground:
Japan is our most important ally in Asia.
It is our second greatest trading partner
• • • Our China and economic initiatives
were a shock to the U.S.-Japanese rela
tionship.7
Nixon wandered into a mire however when he speculated
that the American-Japanese relationship had,
• • • already been overtaken by time and
Japan's phenomenal economic growth. The
shocks of 1971, therefore, only accelerated
an evolution in U.S.-Japanese relations
that was in any event, overdue, unavoidable,
and in the long run, desirable. 8
That the shocks may have been unavoidable on a cost-gain
analysis, limited to their "natural ll aspects, is possible.
That the shocks were either overdue or desirable has yet
to be proven.
7 Ibid ., p. 339.
8 Ibid •

7

A fifth important point made by President Nixon in
his message to the Congress read to the effect that the
Nixon administration would enjoy seeing a remilitarized
and increased politicized role for Japan in Asia:
Japan has long since acquired responsi
bility for its own conventional defense.
However (the President asks, speaking
curiously in the past tense), Japan con
tinued to rely on American nuclear power
for strategic s.ecurity. It was, more
over, prevented by constitutional, poli
tical, and psychological factors, and by
the attitudes of its Asian neighbors from
projecting military power beyond its own
borders~
Thus the l1utual Security Treaty
continued to serve Japan's interests, as
well as our own. Still, it was clear that
changes would come in our defense relation
ship as Japan regained its strength and
pride. 9
What is unclear is whether, as Japan regained "its
strength and pride H and projected its "military power
beyond its own borders," this would be done in the longterm interest of the United States.
Added to the inherent political, military and
economic problems of Japan's expansion, is the problem
of general Asian insecurity.

Asia is a region of in

stability (e.g., Indochina), fraught with struggles of
anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, nationalism and
socialism to name a few.

The American withdrawal as in

dicated in the Nixon doctrine, can only lead to further
9 Ib id., P • 340.

8

instability as the remaining po\Vers vie to better their
respective positions.
Another important factor of future Asian poli
tics is that, of the world's current five Great Powers,
four are committed in strength to the Asia-Pacific
region.

Only the European Community can be excluded.

For the purpose of this paper, a distinction will be
made between the terms trGreat Power" and "Superpower. 1I
Of the five Great Powers (i.e., China, the European
Community, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United
States), only the latter two can be considered Super
powers.

Japan lacks Superpower status since it lacks

a credible military, especially nuclear, establishment.
Only the two Superpowers share global interests
and

responsibil~ties

that include Asia.

The possibility

of a future domination by either Superpower of the Asian
I

region, even given the assistance of a third Great Power,
would seem remote.

This is because the global commit

ments of the Superpowers makes it impossible to concen
trate the totality of their power in anyone given area.
It is also this "global factor ll that tends to limit and
decrease the Superpower's superiority over any third
power in a local conflict.

'Iihe inherent danger for a

Superpower in overcommitting itself to anyone region
at the expense of its global responsibilities is clear

9
(e.g., the

u.s.

in Vietnam:

1965 - 1969).

Another factor which diminishes the influence of
the Superpowers in dealing with either of the other two
Asian Great Powers, is that they have their centers of
power located at a distance far from Asia.

This factor

will probably be more important in the case of the
united States, and less so in the case· of the Soviet
Union through the 1970's.

This is because while Soviet

influence in the East is generally on the incline
(e.g., India), the influence and support of the United
States is on the decline.

The reduction of American

bases in Asia include not only those in Vietnam, but
also numerous bases in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand
and Japan.

In addition, the assumption of Japanese

restrictions of,. future American rights in the military
use of Okinawa (the key base of American Pacific deI

fense), will mean a reduction of American military
effectiveness in the region and a probable increase of
friction in American-Okinawan (Japanese) relations.
Nevertheless, it must remain clear that the
Pacific Ocean acts in the twentieth century less as a
barrier than as a conduit between the powers, making
for a certain, if often confusing, overlapping of inter
ests.

Any change in the Asian balance of power whether

positive or negative, opens new opportunities as well

10

as dangers to all the nations that share responsibili

Ties in the Pacific area.
Without doubt, one of the region's greatest dangers
to peace is the Sino-Soviet dispute.

This conflict

carries within it a danger to regional peace since it
has a high potential for disruption, while simultane
ously carrying the greatest of potentials for destruc
tion.It is somewhere within the center-range between
these two hostile powers that Japan's foreign policy
balances itself.

Both China and the Soviet Union com

pete for the security that an alliance with Japan would
provide.

In turn, the Japanese have made their posi

tion on a definite comnitment to either side purposely
unclear.

Yet Japan may be forced into some stronger

alignment in its policies, given the possibility of a
further focusing of acuteness in the Sino-Soviet problem.
The current problems between the Soviet Union and
China are many of which territorial questions, ideologi
cal differences, general deep-seated hatreds, mutual
racial contempt, and a variety of age-old rivalries,
are only a few.

The question of a possible Sino-Soviet

reconciliation in the near future is an open-ended one,
and is represented by two schools of thought resting at
opposite poles.

China's current weakness in relation

to the USSR (which in 1972 had some 44 army divisions

11
stationed on the China border representing over one-

quarter of the entire Soviet Army and representing 14
more army division than were employed on the border
in 1970),10 would probably indicate a concomitant weak
.desire to negotiate with the Soviet Union until a
significant power shift occurs.

In any case, the

problem will remain of paramount importance to the
future foreign policy of Japan vis-a-vis China, the
Soviet Union and the United States.
Although any future

co~~ination

among Asia's four

Great Powers is possible, the tie between Japan and the
United States would seem the most stable (assuming that
future "Nixon shocks" can be avoided).

In contrast, the

position of China and the U.S.S.R. seems to be least
stable, with both countries having much to gain from
any strong affiliation with a third Great Power.

In

East Asia the most likely and best choice for both
countries is an affiliation with Japan.
To a very large degree the future course of
Japan's foreign policy will have a tremendous impact
upon the balance of power in Asia.

While in the past

the Japanese could rely on American military protection
10
Taken from a report issued by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in London. See Japan
Times (May 3, 1972), p. 4.
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at a time when they expanded economically, such an
open alternative for the
ful.

is increasingly doubt

f~ture

With the American debacle in Vietnam winding down

and the old American policy bf quasi-indiscriminate
"';,

'

force-application being partialry transformed into the
application of accommodation, the 'Japanese (and others)
are beginning to question the seriousness of American
reliance and determination in its commitments to Asia.
The Government of Prime Minister Tanaka is aware that
any reduction of reliance in the U.S.-Japanese security
agreement must mean an increased dependence upon some
other Great Power (i.e., China or the Soviet Union),
or upon themselves.

CHAPTER II
POLITICS IN THE POST-WAR ERA
The history of modern democratic Japan emerged
from the ashes of World War II.

The victors of that

war, or more specifically the Americans, grafted a
variety of Western values and incentives on post-war
Japan.

Although the Emperor-system was not to be elimi

nated as the Soviets vigorously suggested, the personal
power and influence of the throne was to be sharply cur
tailed, and the governmental structure was to be con
formed more closely to democratic principles.

Japan

would be encouraged to develop and strengthen individ
ual liberties,
viable economy.

~.emocratic

organizations, and, later, a

In addition, Japan was to be de-mili

,

tarized, both in terms of the internal leadership struc
ture and in terms of relative international power.

These

reforms, accompanied by the implementation of others
differing in scope but not objectives, were designed to
mold Japan in such a way that would make impossible her
straying from the path of peace in the future.
The reforms that called for the de-militarization
and democratization of Japan also declared that the
Japanese people should forever renounce war as a

14
sovereign right.

The threat or the use of force were

to be discarded as a means for Japan to ever settle
international disputes, and the Japanese people pledged
themselves never to maintain air, sea or land forces
or other war potential.

All of these stipulations

presumed at least two conditions:

first, that the

policy implemented from above by the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers (an alien organization), would
take hold; and second, that the defense of the
Japanese islands would henceforth be adequately pre
served by American military power.

These assumptions

were to be critically tested in the 1970's.
With the advent of the Cold War in 1948 the
American occupation authorities began to move in a
direction that was intended to see a rapid vitalization
of the Japanese economy.

Within two years, Japanese

production had nearly returned to its pre-war levels.
Simultaneously, a counterreaction to the re-birth of the
economy emerged, both outside and within, the Japanese
Communist Party (JCP).

The Communists increasingly

assumed a role of opposition to the new course that the
country was taking.

The JCP felt that a rebuilding of

the economy would eventually and inevitably lead Japan
into a.new capitalist war.

Ironically enough, it was

the occupation's program of political emancipation that

15
provided an opportunity for the Communists to become
l
a significant force in Japanese politics.
Peace was signed between the United States and
Japan on September 8, 1950.

While the united States

favored coming to terms with Japan in a policy designed
to rebuild the shattered economy. Russia favored puni
tive action.

The Soviet union felt, as did most other

East Asian countries, that Japan should not be allowed
to rebuild a strong economic base from which it could
again economically and militarily expand.

However, Japan was within the American sphere
of control and the strong input of economic assistance
that was needed prior to an economic rebirth was both
allowed and provided.

On the same day that the

Japanese-American peace treaty came into effect (April
28, 1952), Japan and the Nationalist Government on
Taiwan signed a treaty of peace.

At the time, this

pact with the Nationalist Government of China:
registered its faith that Japan had aban
doned its imperialism and became an out
post for the world's defense against com
munism. Japan recognized Chiang Kai-shek
as the sovereign authority in Formosa,
1

Claude Albert Buss, Asia in the Modern World:
A History of China, Japan, South and Southeast Asia
(New York: ,Macmillan, 1964), p. 519.

16
the Pescadores, and the territories which
might in the future come under his con
trol. Japan was not willinq to endorse
Chiang's sovereignty over the entire
mainland. 2
Throughout and beyond the 1950's and 1960's,
.Japan was to emerge increasingly as both an economic
power in Asia, as well as an economic power in the world.
During this period of growth and to the present day,
Japan has been ruled continuously by the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP).

The platform of this basically

conservative party has generally called for peace in the
spirit of the United Nations and for a limited rearma
ment to provide a means of "self-defense."

The Liberal

Democrats have historically looked unfavorably at atomic
or hydrogen weapons, both for use by Japan itself, or
by others from ,Japanese soil (i.e., the united States).
The LDP has publicly favored both stronger economic ties
I

with the People's Republic of China, as well as a nor
malization of political relations with both China and
the Soviet Union.

Increased trade with both China

and the Soviet Union has become a strong element of
Japanese economic life.
Since the Second World War the main theme of
Japanese politics has been that of the success of the
2 Ibid ., pp. 525-526.
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Liberal Democratic Party in withstanding the challenges
by all other parties to their domestic political domina
tion.

The Liberal Democrats have ideologically been

the bitter foe of left wingism and of the Communists.
Especially in the 1950's. but decreasingly in the
1960's, the strongest party of the socialist movement
has been the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP).

The

Socialists could in the 1950's claim the allegiance
of a great mass of the Japanese people.

For a variety

of reasons, however, the most obvious being the rising
affluence of the average Japanese worker, the socialist
movement has recently lost much of its support.

In the

1960's the greatest support for the JSP came from two
groups:

the Marxist-oriented students; and the two

largest federations of labor

~

unions.~

An important

problem for the Socialists has been to tie these two
divergent groups together in purpose and action.
The JSP has also suffered from a variety of
other difficulties such as a general lack of funds,
failure to gain support from the growing middle class
and party factionalism.

The cleavages within the ranks

of the Socialist party in 1959 were so sharp that a
faction of rightists under Nishio Suehiro defected from
3The Sohyo and the Zemo.
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the main party to set up ,a separate party, the Demo
cratic Socialist Party

(DS~)~

The split of the DSP

had come about following a refusal by the right wing
of the JSP to accept a statement by the party's assumed
. leader, Asanuma, made in Peking 'in 1959, which read to
the effect that the Americans, as imperialists, were
the common enemy to both Japan and China.
Until the JSP-DSP split, the former had been the
only significant left wing party in Japan.
main ideological tenets of the JSP are:
pacifism and nationalism.

The three

socialism,

The thinking of the Socialist

has been generally doctrinaire rather than pragmatic,
and this has resulted in a basic antipathy towards
capitalist co.untries, especially the United States. 4
In general, the JSP has opposed American foreign policy
in East Asia and its members have wanted to see Japan
develop relations with North Korea and North Vietnam.

5

4J • A. A. Stockwin, "Foreign Policy Perspectives
on the Japanese Left: Confrontation or Consensus?"
Pacific Affairs, Winter 1969-70, p. 441.

SAS late as mid-May of 1972 the JSP had reiterated
its foreign policy posi~ion in the Asia-Pacific region,
calling for a neutral zone brought by an establishment
of a collective security system. Incorporated within
this would be the abrogation of all military alliances
between the Asian nations including especially the Great
Powers. This would also include the withdrawal of all
foreign troops from the Asia-Pacific region with the
establishment of a blanket neutrality zone. See The Japan
Time~, May 15, 1972, p. 2.

19
The Socialists have adopted a policy of "positive
neutralism" and wish to avoid any military alliances
which would commit Japan to another country.

The policy

of the JSP has been that Japan should stand outside the
Western and Communist blocs, but should establish
friendly relations with both.

In this sense, the JSP

has felt for some time that Taiwan is a part of China
and that American military forces should be immediately
withdrawn.

In 1963 the party approved the partial

nuclear test-ban treaty, thereby taking a stand approved
by the West and the Soviet Union but condemned by China.
A repeated cause for the factionalism that has
plagued the Japanese S09ialist Party has been the failure
of the party's moderates adequately to balance the
extremists.

There have been a number of splits in

addi tion to the one in 1959 which created the DemocraOtic
Socialist Party.

Fot example, as early as 1948 the

"Hirano-faction" split from the main Socialist body in
January, as did the Nishio faction in July.

Both of

these factions were of the right wing, and both were
reunited to the main body in 1952.

A left wing faction

also split away from the JSP in July of 1948, forming
the Worker-Farmer Party in December.

It was not until

1957 at theDth JSP Convention that the Kuroda faction

(i.e., the Worker-Farmer Party), was reunited with the

20

main body of Socialists.

Another important break within

the ranks of the Socialist party came in 1951 when the
entire Socialist Party split intb the "Left-JSP" and
"Right-JSP."

A reunification was, however, affected

in October of 1955.
In 1965 the Socialists were dominated by the
Sasaki faction which set the tone for the party's
foreign policy in that decade.

"This faction has re

peatedly shown itself susceptible to being drawn into
the pro-China position favored by members of the ex
tremist 'Heiwa Doshikai' {Peace Friends Associati01)." 6
The defection of the Communist Party of Japan in 1966
from its former allegiance to Peking coincided with the
trend in the Japanese Socialist Party "and was closely
related to it. '''':
An additional complication for Japanese Leftists
I

has been the strong side affect exerted by the centri
fugal forces of the Sino-Soviet split.

In 1968 the

so-called "Yamamoto-Oshiba" group broke from the
Sasaki faction (which in 1968 had been the predominant
influence within the JSP).

The position of the "Yamamoto-

Oshiba" group was less doctrinaire than that of the
6Stockwin, p. 441.
7 Ibid •
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Sasaki faction, and wanted to support the policies of
the Soviet Union at China' ~ e~pense.'

Representing the

Maoist line and resting at the opposite end of the
party's political spectrum was the Heiwa Doshikai.
In both 1969 and 1970 the Heiwa'6oshikai was increasingly
attracting local activists in substantial numbers
(which in turn would increase their strength at future
party congresses).
Following the Nixon visit to China, it became ap
parent that the Japanese Socialist Party and the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) did not
share similar views on the issues of either the China
US rapprochement or Japan's moves to normalize Japanese
Chinese relations.

While recent members of the CPSU

visiting in Japan (at JSP invitation) have remarked
that the US-China communique, for example, will not
ease tensions and was designed only to split the
Communist bloc, members of the Japanese Socialist Party
have said that the Nixon visit to Peking will help form
the necessary conditions for a general "detente n in
Asia.

For the Soviets, the biggest fear in the immedi

ate future is whether Japan might soon normalize rela
tions with both China and North Korea (which would then
lead to increased anti-Soviet feelings in Japan.)
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The rise in popularity of the Japanese Communist
Party to a prominent place. in, Japanese politics is a
relatively recent phenomenon.

During the 1950's and

1960' s the Japanese Communis't Party (JCP) exerted less
influence than the Socialists,' for the most part be
cause the Communists have often been associated with
the Soviet Union (whose earlier opposition to the
Emperor-system, for example, has been noted).

A

general asset for the more recent popularity of the
JCP in Japan has been its historical hatred for the
policies of the United States.
Since the beginning of Japan's post-war politics
the Soviet Union has been looked upon with general dis
approval.

Several reasons can be identified with the

Japanese attitude, the most obvious being the fear that
many Japanese have held over the possible ties that may
exist between the Communist Parties of Russia and
Japan, and the implications that this could have in the
political future of Japan.

Also, the Japanese remember

the Soviet attack on Japan in the last days of the war,
and following its quick conclusion, Russian treatment
of Japanese prisoners who, when finally repatriated,
returned with

II

\vashing." 8

heavy influx of anti-Russian feelings 'were

8

A

lurid tales of forced labor and brain- .

Buss, p. 630.
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provided by the repatriations since, according lito
Japanese figures,

approxi~t~ly

1,300,000 nationals,

including civilians, had been incarcerated by the
.
• • • • "9
RUSS1ans

However, in more recent times

this fear has partly subsided; associated with the
current Sino-Soviet split and the' relatively indepen
dent position taken by the Japanese Communist Party
on the matter.
Unlike the Japanese Socialist Party, the Commun
ist Party of Japan did not support the nuclear test
ban treaty, and the JCP broke with Moscow in 1963 when
the USSR signed the document.

The Japanese Communists

strongly opposed the treaty on the grounds that it was
inflicted with Superpower arrogance.

The rift between

the JCP and Moscow was intensified by what the Japanese
Communists regarded as the "meddlesome attempts by
Moscow to turn a rebellious faction led by Yoshio
Shiga, a longtime party member, into a splinter
Communist party subject to Kremlin dicates. nlO

In

1966, the Japanese Communists refused to send delegates
to the 23rd Soviet Congress. and in 1970 declined to
9Robert D. Warth, Soviet Russia in World
Politics (New York: Twayne Publishers,:rnc., 1963), .
p. 376.
10
The New York Times, !1arch 22, 1971, p. 11.
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invite a soviet delegation to the JCP Congress, even
ignoring

~1oscow's

congratulatory message

addressed to

that meeting.
With the Soviet friendship offensive of 1971
aimed at Japan in general, it appeared that JCP-CPSU
relations might improve.

On March 2i, 1971, the

Japanese Communist Party agreed to send a delegation to
the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, which
opened March 30, 1971 in Moscow.

The agreement was

reached by Tomio Nishizawa, a member of the JCP
Presidium, who led a four-man team to Moscow to meet
with Soviet Presidium member, Mikhail A. Suslov.

But

while party relations between the Soviet and Japanese
Communists had shown improvements by March of 1972, the
Japan-Soviet

F~~endship

Society appeared to be heading

for a crisis with its director resigning and most of its
other ranking officidls threatening to follow suit.

The

crisis followed a Soviet demand that former dissident
members of the Japanese Communist Party be expelled from
the Society.

The Friendship Society had been important

during the 1963-1971 period, serving as a channel for
Japanese-Soviet cultural exchanges until the political
thaw between the JCP and the CPSU in the Spring and Sum
mer of 1971.
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The Japanese Communist Party is the strongest
Marxist party in non-Communist Asia and the best or
ganized.

Currently its membership numbers over

300,000 and in Japan's 1969 general election, for exam
pIe, it polled over 3.2 million votes.

One observer

has noted that the JCP "has been probably the most
genuinely pro-Peking of all the Communist parties in
the world •

Its greatest weakness has been

that it has been unable to mobilize massive Japanese
public support for the Chinese cause.
Diplomacy between Japan and China has been car
ried out not on official levels, but rather through
what the Chinese have called "people's diplomacy."
This form of diplomacy exists at all levels other than
official ones.

It has been largely here that the JCP

has been able to act on China's behalf within the
Japanese domestic scene.
Although the Japanese Communist Party has been
closer to Peking than Moscow since 1963, the JCP's
position since 1965 has still been one of basic neu
trality.

This has been partially due to increased

Soviet wooing since 1965, and, also partially from the
llvidya Prakasn Dutt, China's Foreign Policy,
1958-1962 (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964),
pp . 242 - 2 4 3 .
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destruction of the Indonesian PKI (Communist Party),
which made the JCP "unques,tionably'" the most important
.

.

'
Commun1S
. t par t
non-ru I 1ng
y '1n A'
S1a. 12

Th e JCP h a d b een,

shocked by the results of what was not
entirely accurately t~en to be Chinese
incitement of the PKI ," 'oy Chinese ob
jections to 'united action' on Vietnam,
by Mao Tse-tung's insistence that the
Japanese Communists should seek power
by armed struggle rather than parli
mentary methods. 1 3
In 1966 the controversy between the Japanese Communist
Party and the People's Republic of China was opened
for public airing when the Japanese expressed their
concern over I..fao' s "personal backing" against an effort
by the JCP to strengthen the Communist position in Viet
nam,and by improving Sino-Soviet relations. 14
From the above examples, it can be seen that the
Japanese Communist Party has not been simply a "camp
follower" of either the Communist Party of Chi:na or
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In 1968, for

example, the JCP had felt quite free publicly to criti
cize Moscow severely for the Soviet invasion of
l2Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest
(London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 225.
l3 Ibid •
l4 Ibid ., p. 133.
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Czechoslovakia, much as it had previously felt free to
boycott Mao's preparations for an international con
ference.

The clamor in 1972 within Japan for improved

China-Japan relations did not include the JCP.

In

fact, the Japanese Communists have been, since January
of 1972, stepping up their attacks on the Mao Government
in China.

On the Chinese side, chairman of the JCP

Miyamoto, "has been ranked along side American imperial
ism,' Soviet revisionism and the reactionary Sato
Cabinet as one of China's four enemies. HIS
One observer has commented that the,
Chinese leadership appears to feel a
mixture of resentment and respect for
Japan as a country whose armies with
drew unbeaten from China in 1945 and
has staged a phenomenal political and
economic recovery from the depths of
the period.
In addition, Japan,
would probably be welcome to Peking as
. a junior political partner if it came
under a government sufficiently anti
American and far to the left, although
not necessarily outright Communist. 16
On July 5, 1972, the date of the JCP's 59th
anniversary, the party was expected to issue a mani
festo of a new political program,17 designed to envisage
15 The Japan Times, April 13, 1972, p. 14.
l6 H~nton,
·
p. 234 •

17 The Japan Times, March 6, 1972, p. 3.
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the creation of a "democratic coalition" government.
The proposed coalition would consist mainly of the
Japanese Socialists and Communists.

In addition, the

July manifesto was expected' to elucidate on the JCP
I

attitude over the question of

~tie

party's non-inter

vention in the Sino-Soviet co~f11ct, the policy of
independence, and non-interference by outsiders in
its affairs.
Thus, from about 1961, with the creation of the
Chairman Nosaka and Secretary General Miyamoto faction
and with the adoption of a platform that rejected the
policy of seizing power by armed revolution; and in
1963, with the creation and adoption of a policy of
non-intervention in the Sino-Soviet conflict and the
1964 explusion of both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese
members from the party; the Japanese Communist Party
has since been able to maintain a relative independent
position from a dominating influence by Communist parties
of either the Soviet Union or of China.
While the Japanese Socialist Party and the Japanese
Communist Party both represent the nOld Left," the
Komeito Party represents the "New Left.tI

However, the

Komeito does not take strong extremist views on Japanese
foreign policy and the ncontent of its official views
on foreign policy are close to the traditions of the
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'Old Left. llIlS

The Sokka,Gakkai, from which the

Komeito broke away, has

be~n.described

as a:

curious blend of religious revivalism and
political activism'of undetermined direc
tion which has made rather impressive
political gains at th~, ~ocal level, but
now seems to be receding as a political
force. 19
As Japan's second largest opposition party, the
Komeito is both militant and nationalistic and faith
fully supported the Chinese admission to the United
Nations. 20 On June 9, 1971, the Peoplels Republic of
China invited the Komeito to send a party delegation to
Peking.

The invitation from China follo\ved by only one

day the announcement by the Komeito Party Chairman,
Yoshikatsu Tadeiri, that henceforth the Komeito would
favor the recognition of Peking as the only qovernment
of China.

Tadeiri also said that the Komeito would now

support the abrogation of the 1952 peace treaty between
Japan and the Nationalist government on' Taiwan. 2l

This

18
·
p. 443 •
, S toc kw~n,

19John F. Melby, uGreat Power Rivalry in East
Asia," International Journal (Sununer 1971), p. 464.
20 The Japanese Communist Party also supported the
Chinese admission to the United Nations, consistent with
left wing attitudes, even though recent relations between
the JCP and Peking have not always been good. See G."P.
Jan, liThe Japanese People and Japan's Policy toward.
Communist China,11 Western Political Quarterly (September
1969), pp. 605-621.
2lSee The New York Times, June 10, 1971, p. 14.
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action moved the party significantly closer to the
policies advocated by the,Japanese Socialist Party.
The Komeito has historically been on bad terms with the
Communist Party of Japan, although it does share certain
similar characteristics with tbe JCP (e.g., both parties
gain much of their political support from the urban
proletariat).
The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which split
from the Japanese Socialist Party in 1959 (see pp. 17
18), shares the same basic attitude as does the Komeito
and the JSP over the question of Japan-China normali
zation~

The Democratic Socialists have also accepted

the three Chinese principals to be met prior to China
entering into talks with Japan on the normalization
question, i.e., that Japan recognize the People's
Republic of China as the sole legal government represen
ting China; that Taiwan is a part of China; and, that
the Japanese-Naionalist China treaty be abolished. 22
Recently,23 top-ranking Chinese officials, in
cluding Premier Chou En-lai, have praised the new left
wing elements in Japan, especially the more extreme
groups such as the Rengo Sekigun (United Red Army).
22 The Japan Times, April 15, 1972, p. 14.
23The Japan Times Weekly, April 22, 1972, p. 4.
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Another extremist faction.praised and supported by
Peking is the "Fukuda

grou~,~

(not related to Foreign

Minister Takeo Fukuda), which split from the Japanese
Communist Party in 1966.
It would appear that the present generation of
young people in Japan are contented with their country's
growing role in Asian and world affairs.

The new genera

tion of Japanese:
are possibly less discontented with the
structure of their society than young
people anywhere. The new generation is
genuinely internationalist-minded, with
an almost desperate urge to be thought
cosmopolitan. It is also vigorously
proud of being Japanese, at least toler
ant of the Emperor system and anxious
that Japan play its rightful role as a
great power. 24
The students since 1967 have, however, caused certain
problems for Japan's political structure.

Hade conspi

cuous by their use of violence, the Japanese students
have faced the party in power (i.e., the Liberal
Democratic Party), with the same kind of problems not
uncommon to. advanced and industrial Western nations.
For example, the students have attacked the foreign
policies of both the Japanese and American governments.
Nevertheless, they have also definitely opposed the
24Frank Gibney, "The View from Japan," Foreign
Affairs, October 1971, p. 102.
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policies of the Japanese Communist Party, which has
in turn labeled the

stude~ts

anarchists and Trotskyites.

The most powerful party in Japan and the party that
has ruled the country 'throughout the post-war period is
the Liberal Democratic Party

~',

'

(D~P).

The LDP is a vast

coalition of basically conservati~e political cliques.
The Liberal Democrats are committed to protectionism
and trade and rice price support policies, which
guarantee the conservative and rural vote.
The "China question" of setting forth the condi
tions for normalization, has been important since be
fore the last decade.

In the early 1960's, and as late

as 1964, the former Primer1inister Ikeda and his party
had been willing to go as far as risking a Taiwanese
boycott and a,
disruption of trade for the sake of
improving trade relations with China
and achieving what was virtually ide
facto' recognition. It stopped short
of diplomatic recognition under the
formula of what was called a'separa
tion of economics and politics. '25
However, the coming to power of the Sato cabinet brought
better relations between Japan and Taiwan at the ex
pense of a significant improvement of Japanese relations
with China.
25F • C. Langdon, "Japanese Liber'al Democratic
Factional Discord on China Policy," Pacific Affairs,
October 1971, p. 404.
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Although the Liberal Democratic Party under Prime
Minister Sato has generally been hostile to the' People's
Republic of China, a substantial body within the LDP
has worked for improved relations between China and
Japan.

In the fall of 1968, the pro-Peking group within

the LDP consisted of a combination of about 86 Diet
members from both houses which called themselves the
Asian-African Problems Study Group.

This group of pro

Peking Dietmen favored the recognition of Peking and its
entry into the United Nations.

It was felt that if

the People's Republic of China gained admission to the
United Nations, it would end that country's comparative
isolation and would enoourage it to cooperate in peace
ful ways with the rest of the world.
As of Nov.ember of 1971, one-third of the entire
Liberal Democratic Party strongly supported the posi
tion of Taiwan, while a slightly larger group backed
Peking.

It has been the policy of the pro-Taiwan ele

ment that, while Taipei rather than Peking should be
recognized as the ureal" China, trade with Peking should
continue as long as it does not interfere with either
Japan-Taiwan relations or with Japan-U.S. relations.
However, it has been the pro-Peking group among the LDP
that seems to have won over the tacit support of the
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so-called uncommitted members, particularly its younger
elements. 26
The group ,,,ithin the Liberal Democratic Party
favoring an improvement of Tokyo-Peking relations was
l'

,

led in 1970 by former Prime Hinister Aiichiro Fujiyama.
On December 9, 1970,
the newly established Dietman's League
for the Normalization of Japan-China
Relations had its inaugural meeting
• • • By early 1971, the League
claimed 379 members or 51 percent of
the Diet • • • • 27
The growing number of groups favoring the normalization
of Sino-Japanese relations have become increasingly
frustrated and militant, especially in 1972, since their
policy of recognition has, as of yet, not been supported
by the ruling leadership of the Liberal Democratic
Party.

The more powerful of these diverse groups and

organizations, to name only a few, include:

the Japan

International Trade Promotion Association, the Japan
Dietman's League for the Promotion of China-Japan Trade,
26 Koj i Nakamura, "Changing Power Balance," Far
East Economic Review, November 27, 1971, p. 8.
--

27~"lilliarn Saywell, "Japan's Role in the Pacific
and China's Response,1t International Journal, Summer
1971, p. 517.
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the Japan-China Friendship Association, the Japan
National Peace Committee, the Japan Red Cross Society,
the Japan Science Conference, and the Asian News
Service. 28
The domestic rewards for Prime Minister Sato's
policies, including the one that governed China rela
tions, reached its height of public approval in 1969.
In late December, 1969, Sato's ruling
LDP won a smashing electoral victory,
gaining a stronger grip on the Diet
• while the opposition Socialists
• lost 50 seats. 29
By November of 1970, the political climate in Japan had
. changed (see Table I).
By October of 1971, in a national opinion poll,
only 23 percent of the Japanese people supported the
Sato government. 30
Part of the reason for the sudden collapse of
Sato's domestic poli~ical support is that,
Japan's current leadership is hardly in
spiring. The Sato government has steadily
played cautious international politics, con
tent to follow the u.S. lead in most matters,
28For a more complete list, see Jan, p. 612.
29Walter LaFeber, "China and Japan: Different Beds,
Different Dreams," Current History, (September 1970),
p. 144.
30
Nakamura, p. 8.
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TABLE I
POLITICAL PARTy 'STRENGTH IN JAPAN
FOLLOWING THE NOVEr1BER 1970
ELECT~ONS3l

LDP
JSP
Komeito
DSP
JCP
Others

Lower House

Upper House

303
91
47
32
14

139

3

6

63
24
9
7

conservative to a fault. The Socialists,
the major opposition party, are not only
committed to a kind of high-buttoned shoe
Marxism which flies in the face of Japan's
economic reality but their Mao first,
anti-imperialist foreign policy embar
rasses the other opposition parties, in
cluding the Communists. 32
Regarding China, the Liberal Democratic Party's basic
attitude had been until the Nixon trip to Peking, with
out initiative, content to faithfully follow the direc
tion set by the u.S. since early in the Cold War.
To a great extent, however, the collapse of Sato's
popularity has corne with the embarrassment of the sudden
and unsuspected nNixon-China n shock.

It has also meant

3lnChina's New Diplomacy: A Symposium II,II
Problems of Communism, XXII (January-February, 1972),
p. 75.

32Gibney, p. 102.
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for Japan a casting away, to a yet undetermined extent,
from the Japanese-American alliance and the close ties
of cooperation.

In late 1971 it was reported that the,

left-Socialists and most other non
Communist opposition qroups-- which
together drew 41.5 percent of the
vote compared to 44.6 percent for
the Liberal Democrats in the June
Upper House elections-- not only
favor accommodation with Peking but
would terminate the American alliance
'and united States' base rights in
Japan and Okinawa. 33
By October of 1971, following the ouster of Nationalist
China from the United Nations and the total failure of
Sato's support for the unpopular U.S. position, outside
of Taiwan and possibly the United States,
the impact of the UN decision appeared
to be felt hardest in Japan, America's
major ally in East Asia and Communist
China's chief rival for influence in
the region. 34
Following the failure of Sato's pro-U.S. and pro-Taiwan
position, the Prime Minister was subjected to a bitter
attack by the four opposition parties, by labor unions,
many businessmen, and a significant portion of his own
party for having sided with the United States and the
losing side.

One Japanese official said:

"For the first

33The New York Times, August 9, 1971, p. 28.
34
.
The New York Times, October 27, 1971, p. 1.
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time since World War II we are losers," and the "Sato
government is responsible for our siding with the
losers. ,,35
Following the Sato policy failure, the call for
his ouster grew louder from the opposition parties and
from many private citizens.

The Japanese Socialist

Party, for example, issued a statement which declared
that the,
deceptive assertion that the United states
and Japan have maintained for 20 post-war
years, that the Taiwan regime was the only
legitimate government of China, has col
lapsed by the action taken in the United
Nations, and the containment policy direct
ed at China has broken down. This repre
sents the complete defeat of Japanese di
plomacy concluded by the Sato government
• • • the Sato government should resign
immediately to take responsibility for its
failure. 36
Nevertheless, on the same day that the JSP statement
was issued, the Sato 90vernment withstood two attacks by
the four opposition parties in the Lower House by votes
of 274 to 169 and 280 to 171.

The following day the

Sato government also survived an attack in the Upper
House by a vote of 132 to 106.
Sato's Foreign Minister, Takeo Fukuda, was his
choice to replace him as Prime Minister.
35 Ibid •
36 Ibid •.

Sato's
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retirement had technically meant he was giving up only
his party post as President.
him as Prime

~1.inister,

If Fukuda had replaced

it would have meant that Sato

could have retained some influence in the government.
The choice of Kakuei Tanaka by the majority of the
Liberal Democratic Party to replace Sato meant a re
jection of the latter's cautious politics.

In addition,

Sato's seal of approval on Fukuda for the post of Prime
Minister probably turned out to be more of a liability
than an asset. '
The choice of Tanaka was not inconsistent with
the current trend in Japanese politics today.

As in

many Western countries, the leftward political trend in
Japan is representative of the changing economic and
social conditions and values.

In part, the longevity

of power by the ruling LDP has come with the failure
of the left to create an ideological umbrella in which
all the" opposition parties could gather under.

This

failure is also indicative of the lack of success thus
far by the opposition parties to draw the necessary
substance for political power from the various factional
groups, citizens, and interests who often give only
begrudging support to the Liberal Democrats.
With oppositional disunity being a major problem
neither the Democratic Socialist Party nor the Komeito
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favor joining with any left wing elements of the other
parties (e.g., the DSP will join with the right wing of
the JSP but not with the Communists, which the JSP
wants included).37

Two power coalitions as alternatives

to the LDP are currently in the process of developing
and growing in

strengt~

first, the JCP and the left

wing of the JSPi and second, a coalition of the Komeito
and the DSP.

In 1972, the three biggest cities in

Japan were ruled by members of the JSP left wing or by
Communist-backed candidates.

One observation has gone

as far to note that at Japan's current rate of urbaniza
tion, the Japanese Communist Party could rule the
country by 1979. 38

.Rev1ew,
.
37 ~
F
Eas t Econom1C
March 4 , 1 9 72, p. 32.
38 Ibid •

CHAPTER III
ECONOl·1IC DEVELOP~-1ENT IN THE
POST-WAR PERIOD
'"

jt

I

Japan has since the Sino-Soviet split found itself
searching for a new image and status in Asia.

The

American withdrawal and reduction of power finds Japan
moving hesitantly forward- to fill some portion of the
newly created vacuum.

During the 1970's, Japan will face

a number of important questions including:

(1) the

northern territories issue; (2) the Sino-Soviet conflict:
(3) the Japan-China normalization issue: (4) the pro
blem from limited American withdrawal in Asia; and, (5)
the rapid rise of the Japanese economy.
Japan has long since become an economic world
power.

In Asia, Japan is now the dominant economic

force.

This power, however, has not come without arous

ing a great deal of fear and resentment.

The Japanese

abroad are often referred to as the "Yellow Yankees" or
"Ugly Japanese.

II

At home it "has already become fashion

able . • • to speak of 'Japan's special responsibility,'
and 'special interests' in this area, 'the single
destiny of the Asians,' and the like."l
IR. Hutching, "Soviet Defense Spendinq and Soviet
External Relations," International Affairs (July 1971),
p. 58.

42
Although few'wou1d fail to concede the Japanese their
rapid economic growth and strong influence in Asia,
not all would go so far to say that the,
expansion of Japanese monopoly capital
in Southeast Asia is equally aimed at
gaining economic benefits and political
advantages. Tokyo is lined by mirages
of a recreated 'co-prosperity sphere
• • • .' 2
To a large degree, it is a matter of perspective whether
one chooses to see Japan's grbwth as sinister or positive
in nature.

In the defense of that country's policies,

one could observe that "Japan has been called upon to
play an increasingly important role in the global attempt
to realize a peaceful and prosperous world community.,,3
During the decade of the 1960's, the emphasis on
Japan's trade was increasingly placed in the direction
of the developed and Communist bloc countries.

In 1960,

47.6 percent of Japanrs trade went to developed countries
and 50.6 percent to less developed, while only 1.8 per
.
.
4
cent went to Commun1st
countr1es.

By 1 969, those

2
' d ., p. 43 •
Ib1

3Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan and Southeast Asia in the
1970's," Current History (April 1971), p. 200.
4Hakusho Tsusho, "Japan Uinistry of International
Trade and Industry White Paper on International Trade"
(1970), p. 140. See Koji Taira, "Japan's Economic

Relations with Asia," Current History:- (April 1971),
p. 228.
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figures had changed in that, 52.1 percent of Japan's
trade now went to developep ~ountries, while only
43.1 percent went to less developed.

The amount going

to Communist countries in 1969 had also risen to 4.8
percent.

More recently, the Japanese business community

has been moving to strengthen economic ties with East
Europe. 5

For the purpose of promoting increased trade,

Japan has been attempting to establish bilateral pri
vate economic committees with the countries of
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

Such

committees already exist between Japan and East Germany,
Hungary and Bulgaria.
TABLE II
JAPAN'S TRADE COMPUTED IN THOUSANDS OF
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WITH CHINA,
TAIWAN AND THE USSR6
,

1961 1962
Japan-USSR
210.3 296.6
Japan-China
47.5 85.5
Japan-Taiwan 164.0 179.9

5

1963
320.0
137.0
229.7

1965 1966 1967
408.5 408.5 514.3 611.5
310.4 469.7 621.0 557.7
278.7 375.2 402.7 465.2

196/.

The Japan Times Weekly, Harch 13, 1972, p. 4.

6Chae-Jin Lee, "The Politics of Sino-Japanese
Trade Relations, 1963-1968,fI Pacific Affairs (Summer
1969), p. 131.
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The breakdown of Japan's' trade with three of its
major partners illuminates several factors.

One factor

is that the greatest increase of trade during this period
occurred between Japan and China.

Moreover, while trade

between Japan and both the USSR and Taiwan experienced
a steady annual increase, trade between Japan and China
in 1967 showed a marked drop.

This sudden decrease in

trade volume can be explained in part, not exclusively in
terms of Japan-China relations, but also in terms of
the general Chinese withdrawal throughout the world,
due to the Cultural Revolution.

It has always been the

Chinese practice to exert influence on Japanese domestic
politics through its commercial contacts.
trade with China from 1967 to 1971

Japan's

indicat~s

two

further factors.
TABLE III
JAPAN'S EXPORT-IMPORT TRADE WITH CHINA
COMPUTED IN THOUSANDS 70F MILLIONS OF
DOLLARS
Japanese exports
Japanese imports
Total Japan/
China Trade

1967
288.3
269.4
557.7

1968
325.4
224.2
549.6

1969
390.8
234.5
625.3

1970 1971
568.9 577.6
253.8 322.2
822.7 . 899.3

7Toshitaro Fukushima, "Politics Not in Command,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 44.
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First, beginning in late 1968 or early 1969,
Japanese-Chinese trade

sho~ed.

a marked increase; and

second, throughout this period, Japanese exports to
China have greatly exceeded imports.

Japan's exports

f,', '

to Taiwan have also usually exceeded
imports.
"

In the year

1969, for example, out of a total of $700 million in
trade, $517 million consisted of Japanese exports to
Taiwan.
Without question the most important problem that
has arisen from the excess ratio of Japanese exports
over imports has not come in the case with Taiwan, but
has occurred with the united States.

On

Mar~h

1, 1972,

united States Secretary of the Treasury, John B.
Connally, preqicted that the u.S. would incur a $1,800
million to $2,000 million deficit with Japan in 1972
despite the new realignment of currencies brought about
in the previous year.

In 1971, the total u.S. deficit

had reached a record $3,206 million,8 and had brought
8.From.January t h rough May of 1972, the Un1ted
.

States had already incurred the greatest deficit for
any given year in its history. With seven months still
remaining in the year, the deficit was still rising be
yond the $3200 level (although the positive effects from
President Nixon's economic policies would probably not
be felt until later in the year).
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about President Nixon's new economic policy.

On

December 18, 1971, the American initiative known in
Japan as the "dollar-shock" brought about a revaluation
of the Japanese yen which reportedly cost Japan's
businesses and industrial interests in the first four
9
months of 1972 over four billion dollars.
Since the yen nupvaluation," Japanese industries
have been diversifying, no longer depending heavily on
America as an export market. 10

For example, Japanese

exports to the United States for the month of March,
1972, was $817,680,000, up 19.4 percent from a year ago.
But for the same month, Japanese exports to West Europe
was $447,620,000, up 25 percent from a year ago, while
Japanese exports to the Communist countries for March
totaled $152,400,000, up 31.5 percent from a year ago.
Nevertheless, the United States was expected to continue
to press for further liberalizations of trade and
capital transactions with Japan. ll
The Nixon revaluation, or "dollar-shock," helped
to further the Japanese recession.

Japan's Gross

9The Japan Times Weekly, April 15, 1972, p. 8.
10Ibid., April 22, 1972, p. 9.
11.The Japan:. Times, l-1arch 2, 1972, p. 9.
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National Product suffered a major drop in 1971 for the
first time since the recession year of 1965.

It was

reported in April of 1972 that the "Japanese economy is
still in trouble as it enters the fiscal year 1972.
The recession is now in its twentieth month •
The Gross National Product for 1971 was up only 6.1 per
cent in real terms.

The annual growth rate since 1966

has normally ranged from 10 percent to 14 percent.

The

official "low" prediction for fiscal year 1971 ending
on :r.larch 31, 1972, was 4.3 percent, the lowest since
1955. 13
The maior economic problem between America and
Japan has been that Japanese exports to the United
states have exceeded imports.

This problem has created

a surplus of American dollar reserves in Japan.

For

Japan, the question has been how to increase imports
I

without worsening the domestic recession.

Inactivity

at arriving at some conclusion by the Japanese could
wreck the delicate balance of the international mone
tary system.

The problem for the united States has

been, and is, how to be more competitive in the world
market.
l2 The Japan Times Weekly, April 15, 1972, P. 4.
l3 The Japan Times, March 2, 1972, p. 1.
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Japanese foreign reserves with all foreign coun
tries were, by the end of 1971, figured to be $15,235
million.

By the end of 1972, that figure could reach a

total of over $20,000 million, and by 1973 over $30,000
million. 14 In comparison, the United States in 1971
held only $12,000 million in foreign reserves.

Also by

comparison, Japan's overall balance of payments during
fiscal 1971 recorded a surplus of $8,043 million, over
four times that of 1970.

Japan today holds more foreign

currency reserves than any other country in the world
except West Germany.

The build-up of foreign reserves

in Japan will probably make Tokyo the eventual major
money market in Asia.
Japan has become the Soviet Union's major trading
partner outside of the Soviet bloc and Japan is now the
maior worldwide trading partner of the People's Republic
of China.

At the same time, Japan's major trading part

ner is still the United States, which absorbs about 30
percent of all Japanese exports.

During the 1960's and

1970's, Japan also developed a strong economic relation
ship with the smaller countries of Asia.

At the Asian

Development Conference held in Jakarta in April of 1970,
Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi revealed that
l4 Far Eastern Economic Review, Harch 4, 1972, p. 33.
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Japan was prepared to aid the smaller countries in Asia
by offering them 1 percent of Japan's total income
(i.e., $1.8 billion).15
Also during the 1960's, Japan's Gross National
Product more than tripled and with the real annual eco
nomic growth rate averaging approximately 12 percent,
Japan moved past both West Germany and the People's
Republic of China to become the world's third most
productive state.

For the future l new markets as well

as new discoveries of natural resources will be needed,
and Japan has already assumed a major role in both trade
and ~nvestment in all of Asia including both Taiwan 16
and South Korea.

By the mid-1970's, assuming Japan

sustains its current economic pace and that the rest of
Asia continues to grow at its present rate, Japan's
Gross National Product will virtually equal that of
all other Asian nations combined. 17

During 1969, Japan

l5Myung-Kun Yiu, liThe Prospects of Japan's
Rearmament," Current History (April 1971), p. 234.
l6 rn March of 1971, Japan's investment in Taiwan
totaled $634 million. See The New York Times, March 3,
1971, p. 14.
- - - 
17Waka~zum~,
'
. p. 200 •
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led the world in trade

exp~nsion

23.7 percent, compared to
percent.

growing at a rate of

~ne.world

average of 13.5

At Japan's normal expansion rate of about

12 percent (assuming that the ,"Nixon dollar-shock"
18"
recession wears off soo~,
the Japanese could over
take the economy of the Soviet union by the late 1970's.
H. Kitamura attempted to explain Japan's growth
rate by theorizing that a high rate of growth in manu
facturing products causes a rapid growth of both pro
ductivity and employment in the secondary and tertiary
sectors. 19

However, once the investment sector is

fully developed and once a large share of the, world
trade in investment goods has been acquired, the growth
rate is bound ,to recede.

Kitamura predicts that he,

would grant that Japan still has the
possibility of economic growth at a
rate of over 10 percent a year for
some time to come (but, he adds), I
am • • • inclined to predict that the
time will come relatively soon when
the single-minded pursuit of economic
l8According to a leading private economic research
institute in Japan (The Nornura Research Institute of
Technology and Economics of Tokyo), the current 'recession
should soon end. By 1974, the Japanese economy should
again enter into another boom period at a growth rate
of 11.3 percent, lasting until about 1976. See The
Japan Times, Harch 23, 1972, p. 14.
19H• Kitamura, "Japan's Economic Growth and its
International Implications," World Today (May 1971),
pp. 195-202.
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growth in the purely quantitative
sense has to be modified. 20
From about 1955 on, Japan experienced a national
economic boom which was centered in heavy industry,
chemicals, and, to a lesser extent, the technological
industries, especially electronics.

Following the

American "hints" leveled at Japan to begin directing
the building of military hardward, certain Japanese
industrialists and businessmen revolted against the
production of military goods and rather toward the pro
duction of quality items, shifting away from the massive
export market and towards the Japanese consumer market.
However, if the Japanese economy is to switch from other
forms to luxury consumer goods, it will have to provide
for its workers the increased wages necessary to buy them.
In 1971, the real gain in Japanese worker's incomes rose
by only 3.9 percent, tme smallest increase in six years. 21
The switch from quantity to quality, and from
heavy and chemical industries of mass production to
highly sophisticated and knowledgeable industries, is not
the only economic problem Japan faces.

Other questions

of social reform that the economy of Japan must answer
20 Ibid ., p. 198.
21The Japan Times t'1eekly, Iviarch 4, 1972, p. 8.
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are:

environmental pollution, structural reform of the

educational system,

1iber~lization

of imports, fu1fi1

ling the expanding needs for raw materials, energy re
sources, and foreign markets; and, a settlement of the
labor shortage, rice surplus, and judicial and party
political struggles.

In the past, Japan has been one of

the world's worse offenders of water, air and land
pollution.
The worsening pollution of air and water
has resulted from exclusive concentration
on the immediate, quantitative expansion
of industry, coupled with disreqard for
the consequences of industrial wastes and
other pollutants on the environment. 22
The expanding needs for economic resources pose
strategic problems for Japan's policy makers.

For

example, Japan is the world's greatest importer of
natural resources.

Since 1965 the Japanese demand for

resources, in a world where the total supply is limited,
has risen from 10 percent to 20 percent each year.23
In 1970, 44.3 percent of all Japanese imports were in
the form of-raw materials.

From 55 percent to 75 per

cent of all copper, lead, and zinc, as well as all
aluminum, nickel, petroleum and uranium had to be
22

..
Far Eastern Econom1c Rev1ew, March 4, 1972, p: 50.

23see The Japan Times Weekly, April 22, 1972, p. 12.
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imported.

Japan currently depends on oil for 70 per

cent of her energy needs (by contrast, the
on oil only 40 percent).

u.s.

depends

Prime Minister Sato has

suggested that Japan's greatest problem for the next
30 years will be fuel supply.24
Currently Japan has enough oil stockpiled to last
only 45 days without resupply.

The Japanese search for

petroleum has nearly reached the point of desperation.
One suggested possible solution for this problem calls
for a direct oil agreement with Iran.

The effective

ness of this suggestion is limited in that it does not
answer the age-old problem of
hostilities.

supply~

given international

Japan has also probed, as a second pos

sibility, the gaining of access to Alaskan oil.

The

consortium formed by the several oil companies to
build the trans-Alaska pipeline,however, has denied
that any oil from the North Slope will go to Japan. 25
An encouraging report was that an underseas oil field

containing a quantity of low sulfur oil had been dis
covered along the continental shelf in the Sea of Japan. 26

III.

24}.'he New York Times, April 9~ 1972, p. I; Section
25

The Japan Times, nay 13, 1972, p. 4.

26
.The Japan Times Weekly, March 4, 1972, p. 9.

,
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Another possible solution may come from the 59
nuclear plants which are
by the year 1985. 27

e.~p~cted

to be functioning

By 1990, over half of Japan's power

needs could be met by nuclear power; by the year 2000,
71 percent.

However, this

doe~'

not necessarily anS\ver

the question of the source of raw materials, i.e.,
these suggestions are limited only to altering the type
of material needed (from petroleum to uranium).
It has been suggested that by 1975 Japan's eco
nomy may become larger than the combined gross national
product of West Germany and the United Kingdom com
28
bined.
Kitamura has also predicted that, while
Japan's foreign investment balance at the end of 1968
was slightly less than $2,000 million, indications are
that by 1975 Japanese foreign investments will rise to
a level of $20,000 million.

By 1980, that figure may

rise again to the new height of $100,000 million.

The

fact that Japan started at such a lotH' economic point
some twenty-five years ago and has risen so far growing
so fast, will cause in the future severe economic ad
justments throughout the entire world.
27Far Eastern Economic Review, March 18, 1972,
p. 52.

28 K1"t amura, p. 199 •
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Herman Kahn 29 has predicted that by the year 2001,
Japan will be the world' s

pre-em~.l.nent

economic po""er.

He has also predicted that by 1990 Japan's per capita
income will have surpassed that of the united States.
TABLE IV
SOME PROJECTIONS FOR JAPANESE GNP:
1970-2000 30

1970
1975
1980
1985
2000

Low

Official

l-1.edium

Bigh

200
300
450
600
1500

200
330
550
825
2000

200
350
600
1000
3000

200
400
750
1300
4500

Given in billions of 1970 dollars.
At any rate, the future of Japan's economic ex
pansion 'ivill be significant.

In addition, some pro

portional increase in Japanese political influence can
also be expected.

The possibilities of an expanded

Japanese military role in Asia is the sub;ect for the
29Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate:
Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1970-)-.
30
Taken from Herman Kahn and lvlax Singer, "Japan
and Pacific Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No.4
(April ·1971), p. 409.
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following chapter.

The,

challenge to Japan ·of·the new inter
national situation is to search for
policies and behavior compatible with
her position as a responsible member
of the international community, and
the community of industn~ally advanc
ed countries in particular. The ex
tent to which Japan may' cooperate in
the task of expanding world trade and
investment in a stable manner will de
pend critically on whether the outside
. world is prepared to treat her as an
equal partner, respecting her own
legitimate interests. 3l
At the same time it is possible that,
Japan once again may adapt herself too
well to the po\Ver play of new imperial
ism as an efficient subcontractor of
the worldwide socio-economic and poli
tical engineering initiated and managed
by the West. Japan's diplomatic im
maturity is well-known • • • Japan
looks down upon her Asian neighbors. 32

31 Kltamura,
. .
2 2.
p.O
32T a~ra,
.
p. 230 .

CHAPTER IV
THE QUESTION OF REMILITARIZATION
.Until the proclamation of the Nixon doctrine in
1969, the Japanese experienced the best of all possible

worlds.

They sat protected under the U.S. nuclear um

brella, expanded their economy at the world's fastest
growth rate, made plans to develop an important mili
tary force, and traded profitably with China as well as
with Peking1s most hated enemies:
Union and the united States.

Taiwan, the Soviet

Since about 1969, however,

Japan has been searching for a new role, one that will
be acceptable to her people and government, and to the
peoples of Asia including China, the Soviet Union, and
the United States.

With the one possible exception of

the U.S., probably every country in Asia opposes and
fears (to some degree) the remilitarization of Japan.
In part, the American role in Asia has been to act
as a buffer between the other Asian Great Powers.

An

example of this is the less than 40,000 American troops
stationt:d in South Korea.

With t.he American presence

in the southern part of the Korean pennisula, it is·
doubtful that a combination of any two Great Powers could
successfully combine against a third.
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It is a stark reality of Asian power
that China and Rus'sia would .prefer the
American presence on ~he Korean penin
sula to the Japanes'e. Given a choice
between Japanese militarism and
American militarism, the Chinese and
Russians would choose the latter any
time. 1
Perhaps the most important long-term question for
Asian politics is concerned with the extent to which
Japan will, in the future, remilitarize.

Opinions on

the subject vary from one extreme to the other.

One

observer has speculated that an,
examination of Japan's current inter
national position and of her relations
with her three largest neighbors-- the
united States, the Soviet Union, and
China-- suggest that the Japanese have
neither the capability nor the inten
tion of assuming a major political
military role and that close, coopera
tive £ies ~ith the United States contirtue
to be t2e basis of their foreign
policy.
Another observer saw the response to Nixo'n' s
"dollar-shocks" of mid and late 1971, among both left
and right in Japanese politics, as a sign that the
united States was getting weak, and that Japan would in
IHahm Pyong-choon, "Korea and the Emerging Asian
Power Balance," Foreign Affairs (January 1972), p. 348.
2Martin E. Weinstein r "Japan and the Continental
Giants," Current History, (April 1971), p. 193.
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turn be forced to rearm.

"The centre, however, which

may for these purposes be taken to be the main body of
the Liberal Democratic Party does not share the inter
pretation of the extremes.,,3

A third view felt it,

is essentially the lack of a cultural
consensus as to the acceptable mode in
which the balance of power is to be
maintained among the Asian powers (the
Soviet Union, China and Japan) that
makes the prospect of international
peace and stability in East Asia rather
bleak. 4
Perhaps no one in Asia, including the Japanese, knew in
mid-1972 the future limits of their remilitarization.
The official government position on the question has
been made clear a ntmmer of times.

For example, in an

article for the Jiyu Shimp05 (the organ of the Liberal
Democratic Party), in early June of 1972, Foreign
Minister Fukuda said that Japan should stay economically
strong but should never try to become a "military power.
Specifically, a number of input factors are im
portant to Japanese military-political considerations.
Some of these factors are:

the fear generated by the

united States withdrawal in Asia; the demands of Japan's
3"Right and Left Both See Rearmament," Economist,
August 28, 1971, p. 27.
4

5

Pyong-choon, p. 344.
See The Japan Times, June 7, 1972, p. 5.
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giant and modernized middle-class style economy; the
mOdern history of Japan, usually finding it closely as
sociated \vith a major world power; the fact that onethird of the present population was born after the
Second World War; the elements of Japanese nationalism
and a desire for big power status; the general instabil
ity in East Asia; that approximately 35 percent of all
Japan's trade is with Asian countries; that the eco
nomic life of Japan depends upon open sea lanes; that
there exists an expressed fear of Russian naval expan
sion; the importance of the growing power of the
Japanese military-industrial complex; and finally, the
constant need of Japan for an access to raw materials.
Since Japan must import nearly all needed fuels
and minerals, an important element of weakness is the
need for open access to raw materials and free access
,
6
to the sea lanes.
This raises the important question as
to the degree of public acceptance of increased
Japanese "protectionism" over their economy by military
means.
Undoubtedly, a general feeling of national
confidence has accompanied the economic boom,
and there is a distinct danger of rising
chauvinistic nationalism. ~·1ishima I s suicide
was symptomatic of this, as is the enormous
6

See pp. 52-54 of this paper.
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proliferation of ultra-right-wing or
ganizations (some 400 with more than
120,000 members). There has also been
an increase in militaristic publica
tions; and the controversies over
educational policies. and the restora
tion of Shintoism are other signs of 7
the changing psycholog.:t'CiilJ. atmosphere.
Although only the Japanese Socialist Party among
the four major Opposition parties argues that Japan should
not have an armed force, few elements within Japanese
society seem to favor an extended re-militarization.

The

younger generation still seems determined that Japan can
be a modern Great Power without having to become a mili
tary one. 8 The "Japanization" of Asian security appeals
neither to the majority of the Japanese public nor to
9
the majority of the country's business sector.
It is
difficult to find any significant units of opinion out
side the vocal right wing extremist groups who support a
major military build-up in Japan.

This attitude is par

ticularly expressed by the Opposition parties.

For exam

pIe, while questioning Prime Minister Sato in the Diet on
February 28, 1972, Junya Yano, Secretary General of the
7

T. C. Rhee, IiJapan: Security and Hilitarism,tI
World Today (September 1971), p. 395.
8Gibney, p. 103.
9zbigniew Brzezinski, "Japan's Global Engagement,"
Foreign Affairs (January 1972), p. 274.
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Komeito, "expressed doubt if it is desirable that Japan
continue its defense build-up when the U.S.-China rap
.

prochement

prom~ses

to reduce

.

tens~ons

.

.

~n As~a.

•• 10

Sato replied that Japan should have a capability to de
fend itself only to the point that it does not pose a
threat to other countries.
The first one-half of the year 1972 was rocked by
a series of "after-shocks" following, and related to, the
American withdrawal in Asia and the resultant shift in
the balance of power.

The primary question for Japan's

role in Asia has been linked to the question of military
rearmament.

There has been a heavy influx of agitation

and opposition to the continued military build-up in the
country.

In the

~iet,

where many of these verbal battles

have been fouqht, a sample survey over a two-month
period, beginning in mid-February and lasting to mid
April, discloses no fewer than four major political
struggles.
The first such political struggle arising as an
"after-shock" from the question of the newly expected
remilitarized role for Japan was probably the most signi
ficant on a long-term basis.

Beginning on February 8,

1972, the Opposition parties paralysed the Diet over the

10 The Japan Times lve,ekly,

~larch

4, 1972, p. 4.
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question of the amount of .money requested in the 1972
defense bill.
days.

The

paralys~s

of the Diet lasted for 18

Finally, on February 26, the Diet voted unani

mously to significantly cut the amount requested for
~',
".
defense.
The second example occurred' on March 9, 1972,
when Japan awoke to the glaring newspaper headlines:
"GSDF Unit 'Sneaks' into Tachikawa Base Under Cover of
Night. nll

The immediate question was over some eighty

members of the Japanese Army (Ground Self-Defense
Forces), who had in a surprise move, occupied the vacant

u.s.

Tachikawa Air Base early the previous morning.

What had apparently upset the local population (the mayor
had hired soundtrucks urging the populace to protest the
action), was that a previous survey conducted by the
Tachikawa Municipal Government in 1971 showed that 82
percent of the citizens opposed the use of the base by
the GSDF. 12
l'lThe Japan Times, March 9, 1972, p. 1.
12 Ibid ., March 18,1972, p. 2. In addition, the
SDF in Japan are barely past the status of a public em
barrassment. ~lost Japanese continue to think that a
strong economy and a unified society are worth more than
numerous divisions. liThe need for armed forces may be
understood by some, but not by many. II See Gibney.
·
p. 108.
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At the same time that the local Tachikawa Govern
ment \vas arguing wi th the Defense Agency, the Opposition
parties within the Diet had been angered by another an
nouncement of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) that the
agency had carried 120 tons of equipment to Okinawa in
preparation for reversion on May 15.

Without first

obtaining the approval of the National Defense Council
(i.e., the supreme civilian body supervising defense
affairs), a commercial freighter had been loaded, ap
parently in secret, on March 7.

When the Diet dis

covered the incident three days later, the issue quickly
became a question of military versus political power.
On March 13, the Director General of the Defense Agency,
after previously threatening to resign, "froze" the
supplies on Okinawa and ordered their return to Japan.
The government also promised to IIreshuffle" those
,
13
Defense Agency personnel concerned.
l3 rn addition to the already existing problems
over Okinawa reversion, the secret transfer of SDF
supplies to that island created new ones. Those
Okinawians who belonged to reformist groups stepped up
their protests against the deployment of SDF units on
the island, while even those who supported the station
ing of the SDF on their island "have been confused by
the clandestine transfer.
See The Japan Times,
March 14, 1972, p. 3.
1I
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The last major political incident to upset the
country in this short two-month survey period was
raised by a Socialist Dietman on April 13, when he dis
closed what he claimed was a classified telegram of the
.p

•

u.s. Navy Department which read that the u.S. and
Japan had recently held talks towards creating a "naval
bilateral nuclear force.,,14

The U.S. Embassy responded

that the alleged plan for 'the force was a "faked docu
ment," and Prime Ministerlsato catagorically denied
that Japan and the u.s.

hid

held such talks.

What exists in Japal1 today are two basically con
flicting trends.

On the +ne hand is a strong public

fear over the question of iremilitarization.
is generally held by the
and intellectuals.

~sses

This fear

as well as most moderates

They feel that the best policy for

Japan is neutrality.

Par~doxically,

this

elem~nt

also

supports, to a certain de$ree, Japan's rearmament but
only for means of limited "self-defense."

The problem

is that first group, who comprise the majority in Japan,
have no clear-cut concept of what limits are defined
by the term "defense."

This confusion makes the group's

position easily exploitable by the minority who arti
culate the second view in Japan today:
l4 Ib •; d., Apr1'I 14 , 1972 , p. 1 •
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66

remilitarization.

This second group is small in numbers,

but tightly knit in unity of discipline and purpose.

In

addition, the second group of,
industrial and financial circles have
combined with the conservative wing of
the ruling LDP to form what is tanta
mount to an 'industrial-political
military complex' for the apparent
purpose of translating the new eco
nomic strength into the politico
military ~phere.15
The policy of the second group has been to gain the
complete remilitarization of Japan, to be accomplished
through two means:

first, the gaining of increased

public support; and second, the increasing of influence
within the government •. Success in this dual policy has
been slower to come in gaining public support than in
increasing influence within the government.

Muchof the

representative elements in this second group are to be
found in the more extreme
right wing factions of the
I
LDP.

Moreover, the group has sufficient strength among

the Liberal Democrats to influence Japan's foreign
policy and military build-up in justification of its
economic interests.
At the end of the Second World War the entire
country, including the big trusts (i.e., the "zaibatsu n ),

15 Rhee, p. 391.
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lay in complete ruin.

As part of the democratization

of Japan, the "zaibatsu" were to be either reduced or
eliminated.

This was necessary, it was felt, since the

big Japanese trusts concentrated too much power in the
hands of a few and were judged partially responsible as
a prime factor in the political decisions leading to war.
Many Japanese and foreign commentators charge today that
the old "zaibatsu" are not dead, only revived.

For

example, such "zaibatsu" as the nKeidanren" and the
IINichikeiren" now publicly speak for Japan's rearmament. 16
The reasons given center not unexpectedly on the need
for Japan to militarily safeguard its economic interests.
There are, however, some distinctions between the
"zaibatsu" of the post-war period and the trusts of
the pre-war period.

The most important change, accord

ing to Shozo Hotta President of the Sumitomo Bank and
senior member of the core of the nzaibatsu"

(the 16

presidents of the "White Water C1ub n ), is that among
the post-war groups the holding company has disappeared. 17
The significance lies within a more independent manage
ment and a greatly reduced vertical control.

16

Among other

Yiu, p. 235.
17
.
The New York Times, March 26, 1971, p. 1, 8.
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changes in today's "zaibatsu" are that:

paternal

authority has diminished, public ownership is now
included, and, society in modern Japan is more de
centralized.

Nevertheless, and perhaps most important,

is that "zaibatsu" has become today strong enough to
influence the government of Japan toward greater mili-,
tary spending. lS
Although the "remilitarists" mayor may not have
succeeded in yet swaying public opinion to their favor,
it is not the public who makes national policy on a dayto-day basis.

An example in the revival of an old spirit

was felt in Tokyo on October 31, 1971, when the SDF,
celebrating their 21st anniversary, marched in review
befofe Prime Minister Sato.

Parading to a variety of

!

imp~sse~
t

foreigners and natives were groups,

!f infantry, ranger and parachute troops,
tn battle dres~, and of white capped sea
~en, airmen in blue helmets, cadets from
the military academy that trains officers
from all three services, and smartly turned
out companies from the army's women's and
nurses corps. Rumbling along behind on
this sunny Sunday morning were medium and
heavy tanks, trucks towing howitzers and
missiles, engineer vehicles carrying res
cue boats and portable bridges, and a
reconnaissance troop in speckled camou- 19
~.~ uniforms aboard Honda motorcycles.
~!

!

~ ~~a:Yjif;~""Ir. "23'5'.
19 The New York Times, November 1, 1971, p. 3.
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Japan is currently engaged in the Fourth Five Year
Defense Plan, first announced on April 27, 1971, and ex
pected to run through 1977.

The Fourth Defense Plan is

nominally limited by the same considerations that limited
its predecessor, the Third Five Year Defense Plan.

Both

plans declared that defense capabilities should be
enhanced in all three services, limited by domestic
production and achieved with a minimal impact on the
economy_

Japan, however,
can be expected to take certain pre
cautionary steps to assure herself an
intermediate degree of security:
(i)
continued expansion of the Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) , especially their naval
and air components; (ii) continued re
search into missiles and nuclear energy;
(iii) further steps towards a massive
armaments industry, if and when it
should become necessary: and (iv) the
preparation of public opinion for these
measures. 20

The new Defense Plan is to become effective on
April 1, 1972, and made Japan the seventh largest
spender on defense in the world, following the United
States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of
China, West Germany, France, and Great Britain.

It

also represents a 220 percent increase over the old
outlay, and calls for an increase in the army from
20

Rhee, pp. 390-391.
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260,000 men to 271,000 men,-an increase in the number
of tanks to 990, the

constl:~ction

of two 8, OOO-ton

helicopter-carrying escort vessels, and the construc
tion of fourteen high-speed

mis~,~le

carriers and 61
".
other naval craft which will almpst double the present
size of the Japanese navy in total tonnage (i.e., from
144,000 tons to 247,000 tons).2l

In addition, the

Fourth Defense Plan would acquire for Japan 170 new
F4J Phantoms 22 and urges the purchase of 920 new planes
23
including 80 supersonic jet trainers.
Although the more general reactions from the two
feuding Communist Asian giants to Japan's recent power
ambitions in Asia will be discussed more fully below,
some immediate react-ion might be useful at this point.
The Peking: Review, published under the title ItJapanese
Militarism Back in the Saddle," a copy from a Japanese
-"white paper" concerning the growth of Japanese military
spending.

The figures on page 71 disclose not only a

steady pattern of growth in spending throughout the entire
period, but also that, since 1969 (the year of the Nixon
doctrine), the pattern of growth spending was broken by
sharp

ncreases.
I The New York Times, April 28, 1971, p. 7.

2W'
'
eJ.ns teJ.n,
p. 194.
3 Ibid •
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TABLE V

JAPAN'S ANNUAL DEFENSE SPENDING:
1950-1971 24
(Given in millions of yen)
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

129,300
126,600
182,600
125,500
135,000
134,900
142,900
143,600
148,400
155,700
160,000

Given at the old rate of 360 yen

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

=

183,500
213,800
247,500
280,800
350,400
345,100
387 .. 000
422,100
483,800
569,500
670,900

one dollar.

Generally, the past policy of China in dealing with
the question of Japanese militarism has been an attempt
to force a split between that country and the U.S.

'):10

day, this policy by qhina may have been reversed in view
of the danger that such a split could necessitate an in
crease in defense spending by Japan.

In fact, fear of

Japan may well have been one of the motives for Pekingts
,recent moves to\vard "detente" with the United States.
AlthQug~

the Japanese military budget in proportional terms

241JiJ'g,panes,e Militarism Back in the Saddle, tf
Peking Review, No.5, January 29, 1971, pp. 20-21.
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is the smallest of the major po'\vers (less than 1 percent
of the total Japanese

Gro~s

National Product), the

Japanese economy already dominates areas of great sensi
tivity to China (especially'Tai.wan and South Korea).
China's attacks on Japan I s late'S't policies are impor
tant for several reasons, which i'nclude among them the
need for a neutralization of a potentially hostile
Japan, especially if faced with a realization in the
Russian threat.

In addition, "Peking views, regarding

Taiwan, Japan's trade and investment in the island and
the historic orientation of the Taiwanese toward Japan
as the chief stimulants to continued separatism there." 25
The future question to be answered by the Chinese
leadership while simultaneously remembering the
Japanese role in the inter-war period, is whether or
not Japan is prepared today to defend its economic
empire in Asia through military means. 26
Both China and the Soviet union have referred to
the reversion of Okinawa as the "Okina'\vinization of
fR
words, both Russia and China see

Japan~~12t:fther

~w~>~· ~...

Reischauer, "Fateful Triangle-- The
United ~~es, Japan and China," The New York Times,
Section IV, September 19, 1971, p:-I3-.-- ---
26 Ibid •

27For example, see The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, Vol. XXIII, No. 23, July 6, 1971, p. 16.--
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the acquisition by Japan of Okinawa and its huge mili
tary bases as a significant step by that country towards
total remilitarization.

As early as December 16, 1969,

Pravda was writting in reference to the Nixon-Sato
Guam meeting that up to then, the post-war expansion of
Japanese militarism in Asia had been 1argely economic
in nature.

The talks between Nixon and Sato indicated

IIthat Japan's ruling circles are now ready to reinforce
economic penetration by political means and; if neces
sary, by military means as well.,,28

In June of 1969,

another Soviet writer had also indicated fears over the
growing military, since,
Japanese monopolies are actively working
to strengthen ASPAC economically and mili
tarily • • • Now Japan's military circles
are giving strong support to plans to set
up a Pacific military alliance-- PATO •
.aWashingtQn wants (the article claimed).
l··wi:l:11-J'·a:p:a:n1 said, to turn PATO into a
'superbloc' s~earheaded against the
USSR.29
A more recent article in Izvestia entitled:

"Arm,

Arm, and Arm some More," published in April of 1971,
28 Ibid., Vol. XXI, No. 50, January 13, 1970,
p. 3.

29 I • Sergienko, "Japanese lviilitarism Raises
Its Head," International Affairs (June 1969), p. 33.
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asked in reference to the drafted new military build
up plan:
Why does Japan need a strong army? The
authors of the draft explain that it will
be charged with the task of participating
in 'limited local wars.' What they mean
by those words can only be guessed. But
it is perfectly obvious that the NDA
(National Defense Agency) is beginning
to ready a military machine for actions 30
that can in no way be called defensive.
Another article published in Moscow was entitled:
"The Tokyo Trial:

A Reminder."

It issued a warning

which could hardly be mistaken in Tokyo.

After noting

the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Tokyo Trial (i.e.,
from May 3,1946 to November 12, 1946), the article
saw,
the same tendencies endangering peace,
which ultimately brought the major war
criminals into the dock in 1946 • • •
once again appearing and developing in 31
the country where these men were tried.
If continued, Japanese rearmament would "acquire a
dangerous significance."

In particular,

the extensive rearm,ament programme is
designed to boost the expansion of
Japanese monopolies in Southeast Asia.
That was revealed last autumn (1970) ••
30"Arm, Arm, and Arm Some More," The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII,~. 17, May 25,
1971, p. 39.
(See also Izvestia, April 30, 1971, p .. 2.)

~ls. Budkevich and M. Rahinsky, "The Tokyo Trial:
A Reminder," International Affairs, (August 1971), p. 74.
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by Nakasone, chief of the National Defense
Agency who said: "Japan will actively in
vest her capital i~ southeast Asia and own
sizeable assets i:l..I. 'this area. This will
give rise to rights and interests and a
vital frontier. In order to defend them,
Japan will eventually require military
strength! '32
,
The article also claimed that: .
there are many men among the ruling circles
of present-day Japan who refuse to reckon with
the experience of history and its lessons,
and who have taken a policy of revenge as a
guide to action.33
.
Finally, for,
those who seek to reverse the tide' of
history, those who ignore the lessons
of history and take the way traveled by
Toio,- Hagaki, and their like, the
Tokyo Trial and the judgment 'of the
International Military Tribunal for the
Far East is a grim warning. 34
What in 'effect is usually meant by the term
"complete remilitarization" is usually meant both the
conventional, as well as nuclear rearming of Japan.
By 1972, Japan had accumulated some experience and a
sizeable mass of data on

~leapon,s

technology in nuclear

systems building and associated delivery systems.

Japan

has, through 1972, kept open its options on building a
32 Ibid •
33 Ibid • , p. 76.
34 Ibid • , p. 107.
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nuclear stockpile and could in no less than six months
from the time of the political decision have a sizea
ble arsenal. 35
The realization of the political decision to begin
building a nuclear arsenal could be brought about given
the proper stimuli.

For example:

If the big powers continue to use nuclear
capability as the yardstick of strength,
Japan one day may feel compelled to go
nuclear. This sobering note of warning
was struck recently by Kiichi Miyazawa,
former Minister of International Trade and
Indu~~ry and one of Japan's elder states
men.
The official government position was expressed by
Foreign Minister Fukuda who said that Japan has a
"nuclear allergy."

He also stated that he felt Japan,

should not have nuclear arms or any sub
stantial military means. Being an eco
nomic power, but declining to be a mili
tary power, we have a certain reserve of
power. We c~n use it for the development 37
of the less advanced part of the world. • •
One reason Japan fears becoming a nuclear military
power is directly linked to its geographic liabilities.
35The New York Times, December 26, 1971, p. 22.
36Far Eastern Economic Review, December 18, 1971,

p. 21.
37"Who Will Succeed Sato in Japan? Interviews with
Three Top Contenders," Newsweek, May 15, 1972, pp. 44

45.
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The vast majority of Japan's population and industry
are concentrated into a small area and are an easy tar
get for nuclear attack.

Japan is also a difficult

country to defend since, unlike the United States, China,
or the Soviet Union, its total area is small, and with
few relatively unoccupied areas, it would not take
many hydrogen bombs to completely saturate all three
main islands.

Keepinq this in mind, neither can one

forget that the only atomic weapons ever actually used
in warfare were dropped on Japan.

This factor has left

the Governments and people of Japan psychologically
squeamish in any association to anything "nuclear."
In this sense, the policy in Japan from 1945 to 1972
has been an aversion to the nuclear question, and even
undue caution when dealing in diplomacy with the
nuclear powers.

The policy of Prime Minister Sato has

been to keep Japan's involvement in international
issues at a minimum, thereby hoping to keep Japan away
as far as possible from active involvement in any general
war.

It was the "post-war nuclear fear" that pressed

Japan to extract from President Nixon a promise to re
move all nuclear weapons from Okinawa prior to reversion.
In·addition, it has been also the past policy of Japan
to keep open at least economic ties with the Cormnunist
countries.

This was in part desiqned to avoid too close
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an association and involvement with the foreign policies
of anyone nuclear power.
If "nuclear aversion" has been linked to the
post-war period in Japan, and, as Prime Minister Sato
and others have said, the revers.i-on of Okinawa in :r.1ay of
1972 ended the post-war era for' Japan; does that mean
that the nuclear aversion has ended also?

Recent indica

tions of Japanese public opinion may in fact be

follO'~v-

ing the pattern previously set regarding the acquision
of conventional arms.

In other words, the old antipathy

to IInuclearization" may have ended as Japan enters its
new role in Asia.

t-lost people in Japan today now be

lieve the country will go nuclear over the next de
cade. 38
Today. in the view of many government of
ficials and industrialists who keep their
"fingers on the public pulse here, the emo
tional antipathy of the Japanese to things
nuclear has all but vanished. . . While
emotional and political opposition to
things nuclear is dying, Japanese techni
cal skills in the nuclear field are rapid
ly increasing, includ~~g the capacity to
make nuclear weapons.
Today, about one-third of the population in Japan
38nl-lissing Superpower, n Economist, July 31, 1971,
p. 14.

39

The New York Times, December 26, 1971. p. 22.
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feels nuclear weapons for the country acceptable if not
desirable. 40
As previously indicated; a variety of Western
values and incentives were "grafted" on Japan.

These

graftings included democratic pX';Ln.cipals as well as a
general demilitarization.

The iatter declared the

Japanese people to forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation.

However, these stipulations pre

sumed at least two conditions:

first, that the policy

implemented from above by the American Supreme Comman
der would actually take hold; and second, that Japan
would henceforth and indefinitely be protected by
American military power.

Democracy and demilitarization

were designed to be instilled in the Japanese by two
means:

by law and by attitude.

If the attitudes of the

Japanese people towards militarization and nucleariza
tion are changing, is it possible that the simultaneou
sly instilled attitudes towards democracy, are concomi
tantly changing?

It

was Article IX in the 1947 Constitution of Japan

that renounced the right for the country to ever main
tain air, sea or land forces or other war potential.
so-called "pacifist clause" was, however, rendered
40 Ibid •

This
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ineffective long ago with the development of the
"Self-Defense Forces."

A second guard against rever

sion to the old pre-war path of militarism was to be
found in Article 96, designed to make constitutional
revision difficult.

It requires "on the part of those

favoring it not only the necessary support in the Diet
but also real confidence that public opinion is on their
side."4l

Yet, in the end, legal considerations may be of

little significance, although many people in Japan consi
der them a safeguard against nuclearization.

This is

because, .. contrary to widespread opinion I ,there is
nothing in the Japanese Constitution that specifically
prohibits nuclear weaporis."42

The only viable defense

of democracy and demilitarization lie outside of the
constitutions and codes, and within the attitudes of the
people.

If the people of Japan have not yet acquired an

attitude for the values of democracy and peace, no paper
constitution will be able to secure it for them.
The real arguments against nuclearization for Japan
today stem from practical considerations.

The advocates

41 R . Storry, "Options for Japan in the 1970's,"
World Today. (August 1970), p. 325.
42The New York Times, December 26. 1971, p. 22.
See a1soK:" Hirasawi, "Japan's Future World Role and
Japanese-American Relations," Orbis (Spring 1971). p.
341.
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against nuclearization cite such considerations as:
Japan's vulnerable position to nuclear attack with 90
percent of the population situated on a 100-mile belt;
Japan cannot hope to catch up with u.s. and Soviet
missae technoloqy and could never really expect to ac
quire a "second-strike" capacity; and, Japan, as a nuclear
power, would probably friqhten the other Asian nations,
in turn having a negative affect on business.

Never

theless, as noted, indications are increasing that with
the u.S. withdrawal, the nuclear threat from China, and
the desire of many Japanese to gain Superpower status,
Japan may in fact be "forced" to acquire nuclear capa
city.

Popular magazines in Japan today carry articles

giving the pro and cons on the nuclear question, anti
nuclear demonstrations find fewer participants each
year, and with the younger generation having no direct
memory of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, nuclear science is
attracting increasing numbers of young students. 43

In

addition to the building of nuclear power plants de
signed to help safisfy Japan's peaceful fuel needs, the
country is expected to complete late in 1972 its first
nuclear ship (the fourth non-warship of its kind in the
worldJ.
43

The New York Times, December 26, 1971, p. 22.
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Finally, there still exists the larqer question of
democracy itself as a
Japan.

viabl~

~nstitution

in a peaceful

One observer has suggested that there is,
widespread criticism'of the Constitution
as 'an alien and impra~,tical' document,
and strong demands, espeCially among
leading members of the LDP, for official
recognition of the Emperor as the Head of
State, with the Cabinet directly responsi
ble to him or, more correctly, to the powers
behind the throne, as during the Meiji
oligarchy. Indeed. the Meiji Constitution
is being cited as the model for future
constitutional amendments. 44

This, in fact, may be the future case for Japan.
In October of 1971, it was reported that the
ruling LDP is moving towards a proposal for a,thorough
revision of the present Constitution.
Osamu Inaba, chairman of the party committee
drafting the revision, said the major
changes would be proposed in the famous 'no
war' article, in controls over military
forces, the political position of the
Emperor, and perhaps in the structure
of the Diet, or Parliament. 45
The change in the Emperor's position would be from the
present status as nthe symbol of the state and the unity
of the people,n to renaming him as the head of state.
The party chairman also noted:
44

Rhee, pp. 395-396.

45 The New York Times, October 30, 1971, p. 11.
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the Emperor as head of state in the
Constitution would reflect a resurgence
of national pride and confidence among
the Japanese and would be another return
to traditional concepts as the Japanese
seek their national identity.46
Thus, the fear of the political and military return by
Japan to the pre-war structure

appear~

a valid one.

Japan's democratic foundation is ex
tremely shallow despite its successful
facade and there is still a wide popular
belief that affairs of state should be
managed by 'those \'Jho know best. ' 4 '7
other observers disagree, suggesting that if Japanese
nationalism revives it probably.will not be centered
around the monarchy, but will, rather, center around the
Japanese race. 48

46 Ibid •

47 Rhee, p. 397.
48

storry, p. 333.

CHAPTER V

JAPAN-UNITED STATES
RELATIONS

Following the defeat of

~ap~n

in 1945, the

American occupation forces attempted to transform the
country's basic attitudes by laying a base from which
a democratic and peaceful society could be built.
Specifically, the transformation of Japanese society
saw the ultimate objectives of peace and democracy
to be a"chieved by:

(1) applying the democratic con

cept in education; (2) encouraging a wide distribution
of income and ownership throughout the population in
the means of production and trade; (3) the elimination
from office and punishment of those persons associated
closely with Japan's militaristic policies at home
and abroad; (4) limiting Japan's sovereignty to only
the immediate home islands; and, (5) the destruction
of the "military establishment and its economic base.

Since under these conditions Japan would not be
able to defend itself, on September 8" 1951, the United
States signed the Treaty of Peace and Mutual Security,
guaranteeing its security.

Although both Article IX

(i. e., the "no-'YTar claus'e") of the Japanese Constitution
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and the Security Treaty pledged Japan to live peace
fully with other nations and to settle disputes only by
amic-sle means, the treaty was modified to read that
Japan was not to be deprived of "the right of indivi
dual and collective self-defense."

At the same time,

the Security Treaty with the United States (as with
similar treaties involving Australia, New Zealand and
the Philippines) did not obligate Japan to assist in
the defense of that country should any of its territory
or armed forces be attacked.

In addition to being re

newed in 1960, the Security Treaty was also revised in
that the United States would

n~l

consult with Japan

before using its bases for war or before introducing
nuclear weapons.

In November of 1969 the Security

Treaty was transformed into the Treaty of Mutual Co
operation and Security.

In a joint message by

President Nixon and Prime Ninister Sato, the new
security treaty was to be continued indefinitely be
yond its June 1970 expiration date.

It was also al

tered to read that either party could now terminate
the treaty whenever so desired.
The meeting in 1969 between President Nixon and
Prime Hinister Sato also produced other results.

The

most important of these included an agreement for the
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1972 reversion of Okinawa, and raised Sato's domestic

popularity to an all-time high.

Sato was so exuberated

with this triumph he declared in a speech that, hence
forth, it would be considered that the "security of
(,

'

the Republic of Korea \vas essen't'ial to Japan's secur
ity," and, in addition, that the lttsecurity of Taiwan
was also a most important factor in the security of
Japan.'~

Since Sato's 1969 speech tying together Japanese
security to the security of Tai\van and South Korea,
world conditions and conditions in Japan have drasti
cally altered.

Until 1969 the conservative Governments

of Japan had centered their foreign policies on close
political, economic, and military ties with the United
States.

~They

saw the Soviet Union as the principal

threat to their security and believed that economic
growth depended on successfully countering thi~ threat~~
In addition, before and through 1969, the united States
had acted as a tremendous supplier of raw materials to
Japan and as a huge market for Japanese exports.

In

Isee The New York Times, November 22, 1969, p. 14,
for complete text. - 
2w'
'
e1ns te1n,
p. 195 •
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military terms,

~erican

air, sea and land forces

largely protected Japan's access to the resources and
markets of the non-Communist world.
On the economic level, the supremacy of the
United States has been lost since 1969.

The American

economy no longer controls the once numerous export
markets, no longer unquestionably controls such vast
accumulations of raw materials, and no longer can
out-compete other countries nearly at will.

On the

political level, both the "detente" with China and the
less than careful manner in which it was carried out,
have, when combined, pushed Japan and the united States
apart, with both casting aside the old beneficial roles
that each had played.
The fact that Japan has gradually in the past
20 years outgrown the old relationship which had cast
I

the country as a junior American partner, could probably
not have been avoided by any American administration.
The problems of American-Japanese relations go far be
yond those enumerated in this paper. 3

Many of these

problems find their source deep in the over-commitments
30ne could even liken Japan's investing role in
vietnam and the economic benefits which were derived,
to the similar role the United States played as a
supplier to the Allies in World War I.
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of the American role in Vietnam.

4

Specifically. the fouF "shocks" which might have
been blunted in intensity through more careful advance
preparation and more gentle application, were:

(l) the

I"

sudden and last minute announcement of Nixon's Peking
trip; (2) the severe economic measures (the suspension
of dollar conversion and a 10 percent surcharge openly
aimed at Japan), and yen revaluation; (3) the imposi
tion of textile quotas; and, (4) the success of getting
Japan to co-sponsor the United Nation motion allowing
Taiwan to keep its membership, which then dramatically
failed.

In the face of this, stability in the Asian

region may nevertheless be'inconceivable without a
continuing. close, cooperative relationship between
Japan and the United States.~
In a statement by President Nixon made in Bangkok,
Thailand, on July 28, 1969, the Nixon doctrine was ex
"piili!ned for its Asian implications:
What we seek for Asia is a community of
"free nations able to go their own way and
'}
,I

~Neither does this paper find itself in dispute
with those world-wide international issues and policies
conductea by the United'States from 1968 through 1972,
extending far beyond the immediate scope of this paper.
5Hirasawa, p. 338.
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seek their own destiny with whatever
cooperation vie can provide-- a com
Munity of independent Asian countries,
developing through mutual cooperation. 6
The President further added:
our cooperation with Japan will be
crucial to our efforts to help other
Asian nations develop in peace.
Japan's partnership with us will be
a key to the success of the Nixon
Doctrine in Asia. 7
The Nixon doctrine as originally enumerated on Guam,
draws a distinction between those countries which are
J

not industrialized and where American defense commit
ments must be limited, and those countries which are
industrialized like Japan, Australia, and Western
Europe where commitments are greater.
If Japan's partnership with the United States is
the "key to the· success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia,"
and the President's methods in arriving at a

lidet~~e"

with China went far to destroy that very partnership,
how was such a policy to be explained?

The attempt was

made by President Nixon in a statement to the Congress
on February 9, 1972:
For our part, we have made it clear that
our aim in Peking is to establish a
6Nixon, "Statement by the President •• • ," p. 53.
7Ibid ." p. 58.
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better mutual understanding of one an
other's policies. We will not seek or
discuss bilateral arrangements that
could adversely affect the interests
of our allies. We have no interest
in arrangements which would sacrifice
our friendship with a lonq-standing
ally to the need for better communica
tion with a long-standing adversary.8
More specifically, Nixon apologized that we:
were able to inform our friends only
shortly before this announcement, and
we understand the complications this
caused for them. There were overriding
reasons for keeping Dr. Kissinger's
July visit secret. We could not risk
advance public disclosure of these con
versations whose outcome we could not
predict • . • Reqardless of how it was
achieved, the change in the U.S.-Chinese
relationship after 20 years of animosity
was bound to be unsettling • • • The
price we paid for secrecy was therefore
unavoidable. It should prove transitory.9
These statements create more questions than
they. answer.

Was Prime Minister Sato of Japan not ex

pected to be able to keep such an important secret?
Surely Sato, following his removal from the post of
Prime Minister would not find the "unsettling" change as
"transitory."

Finally, a price could in fact be ex

pected to be paid in Japanese-American relations, but
the vital question to be answered is whether the

aN'l.xon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's ••
p. 341.
9 Ibid •• p. 329.

.,
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improvement in Chinese relations was worth the price
paid by America or

whether it came too high.

Following the Nixon visit to China, Marshall
~reen,

the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and

Pacific Affairs, was sent to the region in an. effort to
bolster sagging spirits and reassure doubting allies.
with his return to the United States he appeared before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and reported
that he,
detected considerable concern, not about
our government's intention to provide
adequate assistance under the Nixon doc
trine, but rather about its ability to
do so in the face of what appears to them
a growing anti-aid attitude in the united
States. There is indeed much concern
lest our programs of support for Asian
nations decline too rapidly. They are
watching closelY to see exactly what we
mean when we say that we stand by our
commitments and that we intend to remain
a Pacific power. lO
Several days later the Assistant Secretary again
publically appeared, this time on the television show,
"Meet the Press.

II

In reply to a question, Assistant

Secretary Green enumerated another fear that had arisen
lOMarshall Green, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs,"Security Assistance for
East Asia and the Long-Range U.S. Interests. Made
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March
23, 1972,," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI,
No. 1712, April 17, 1972, ~ 579.
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from the conduct of recent American actions in Asia:
The question of whether there were any
secret deals, for example, 'Vlnether there
were any kinds of negotiations behind
their back; and I think I vIas able to
prove convincingly that there was not. ll
Neither the premise of no secret deals having been made,
nor the conclusion that all were convinced by the
Assistant Secretary, has yet been proven.

Today in

Japan and in Asia those very two fears remain.
Perhaps the primary example in the reduction of
American Pacific power outside of Vietnam itself, is
the retired position of the United States in Okinawa.
Actually, Okinawa represents only the last of several
territories returned by America since the war.

The

Amami Islands lying south of Kyushu, were returned to
Japan in

Decem~er

of 1954.

In June of 1968, the Bonin

Islands, which includes Iow-Jima, were returned.
Okinawa was returned'in 1972 and became Japan's 47th
Prefecture.
The United States still has, as of 1972, 101
military installations in Japan, 80 of them in
Okinawa.

More importantly, Okinawa serves as the

nerve center for united States defense in the Pacific.
By reverting the military complex back to the
II" Ass~stant
.
Secretary Green

the Press, II ibid., p. 572.

.

Interv~ewe

d on t-1eet
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administrative control of Japan, the

u.s.

is now limited

to "prior approval" from th,at. country before the im
plementation of any American military initiative.

The

reversion of American "military sovereignty" in Okinawa
means the

u.s.

must now consult, with Japan before in

creasing military strength on any'of its "Japanese"
bases, before making any majorequipment changes, or be
fore directing combat military operations from those
bases.

Reversion also adds Okinawa to the list of

Asian countries in which the
weapons.
the

u.s.

u.s.

may not store nuclear

Moreover, since Taiwan is also "nuclear free,"
must now depend on South Korea and the

Fhilippines, in addition to several other minor South
East Asian areas, for nuclear deployment.
The concession of military sovereignty by the
United States in the reversion of Ok,inawa was a,lso de
signed to provide positive results.

By ending American

occupation of former Japanese territory, America was
making good on its pledge of no territorial gains from
World War II.

In addition, by reverting Okinawa, it was

hoped that a source of tension would be eliminated, in
addition to also establishing diplomatic equality be
tween the United States and Japan.
never be truly equal to the

u.s.

However, Japan can'

as long as any American
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military bases exist anywhere on Japanese territory.
Moreover, it appears that the reversion of Okinawan
administration to Japan may actually increase tensions,
since the purpose of Okinawa for the

u.s.

is obviously

military, while any American military operations from
"Japanese soil" simultaneously "implicate" Japan, and
are therefore resented.
Okinawa if not handled careful by both sides could
turn into an easily exploitable'political issue.

Indi

cations are that Japan vlill seek in the future an even
closer control over American military movement to, from,
and within the country.12

This action would go far to

impair American military effectiveness in Asia and
could produce a conflict of interest, as long as America
has important interests in Asia.
Some earlier problems over the new status of
Okinawa have already arisen.

For example, B-52 bombers

might be permanently banned from use in Okinawa, thereby
forcing the

u.s.

to rely on' either Guam or Thailand.

The question of how long Thailand will remain secure to
American forces is an interesting one, while Guam is
hundreds of extra miles from both Southeast Asia and
l2 The Japan Times, April 26, 1971. p. 1.
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South Korea.

Although Guam is an American territory,

the other islands are held under a United Nations
trusteeship with their future unresolved.
Problems over American-Japanese co-rule had
appeared even before Okinawa had been returned.

While

the Japanese Communist Party opposed the conditions of
the agreement returning Okinawa, the Japanese Socialist
Party claimed that the reversion of Okinawa "at the
hands of the Sato Cabinet and the U.S. Government is
deceptive because it tramples underfoot the Okinawans'
wish for an unconditional reversion. n13

Without un

conditional reversion, the complaint went, there was a
chance that Japan might be drawn into a war.

The

Komeito did express some support for the American return
of the islands, but added that "the strong desire for
the elimination of everything that might lead to war and
for guaranteed basic rights for the Okinawans,,14 were
not fully satisfied.

The Democratic Socialist Party

followed the same policy line as the others, criticizing
the U.S. base riqhts in Okinawa.
All the Diet members from both the Japan Socialist
Party and the Japan Communist Party, as well as the
13 Ib l.· d ., May,
15 1972 , p .1.
14 Ibid •
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seven Dietmen elected from Okinawa, boycotted the
government-sponsored ceremonies celebrating reversion.
The other two parties attended the ceremonies, but
added that they would probably join any new campaign
designed to "improve" the terms of the Okinawan
agreement. IS
Within days following the American return of the
islands, problems were already building over what
degree Japanese authorities would allow the United
States to use its bases on the island.

The government

expressed fear that it might be "drawn into" the war
in Vietnam, since the U.s. continued to use its bases
at several locations in Japan to:

(1) conduct a mid

air refueling of Vietnam-bound B-S2's by planes based
on Okinawa; (2) transfer F-4 Phantom jets from Iwakuni
Air Base to Vietnam; (3) sail U.s. naval ships then in
port from Yokosuka to the South China Sea; and, (4)
bring tanks from Vietnam to American bases for the
purpose of conducting repairs. 16

In reply to the

Japanese fear, a:
U.S. State Department official said that
the U.S. would expect an affirmative reply
l5 Ibid ., May 14, 1972, p. 2.
16The New York Times, April 2S, 1972, p. 9.
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from Japan to a request for permission
to use u.s. military bases in Japan,
including those in Okinawa, for combat
operations.!7
Although President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato
exchanged friendly greetings during the Okinawan re
version ceremonies using the newly installed "hot line"
between the countries for the first time, the real
significance in policy direction for the United States
following reversion was that it represented a very signi
ficant step in the dismantling of the American contain
ment of China.

Since Okinawa lies close off the China

coast, any increased responsibilities for Japan within
the confines of the important military base could hardly
serve to better Japan-China relations.

Not only was the

reversion important in American foreign policy, but fol
lowing its celebration, China reduced its quanity and
strength of criticism directed against the Japanese
U.S. Security Treaty.lS

The leadership of China realize

that they have as much to lose from the remilitariza
tion of Japan as anyone in Asia.
In 1972 American-Japanese relations were at their
lowest point since the end of the war.

Part of the pro

blem is personal with the Nixon Administration.
l7 The Japan Times, March 17, 1971, p. 1.
18 I bid., r4ay 19, 1972, p. 1.
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is a distinct op1n1on existing in Japan
that Dr. Kissinger is 'anti-Japanese/'
that he does not know Asia and makes
light of it. Kissinger is seen as a
'Machiavellian type' who is distrusted
by many Japanese based on his role in
Nixon's Asian policies. 19
A second major complaint was that although Kissinger had
had time to go to Peking to arrange through secret talks
with Chinese leaders for Nixon's visit, he seemed to
have no time to visit America's most important ally in
Asia.

From April 20 through April 24 of 1972, Kissinger

was in Moscow (after having cancelled a trip to Japan
over the vietnam question), for secret talks with Soviet
leaders on the upcoming Nixon Sununit conference.

Dr.

Kissinger did not finally arrive in Japan until mid-June,
after a second postponment in May over the Moscow trip.
lvloreover, the Kissinger delays to Japan were seen as:
another instance of the United States'
growing indifterence to its Asian ally . • •
The conclusion here is that the White
House has shifted the terms of the
Japanese alliance to its own advantage
and invited Japan to take it or leave
it.
'I think Mr. Kissinger sees us as
a childish and emotional country, and
he is proceeding on that basis,' a
senior Foreign Ministry official said • • • 20
In addition, the Japanese see Kissinger as the embodiment
of the anti-Japanese
19

mood~

insensitive to modern Japan

The Japan Times Weekly, April 22, 1972, p. 3.

20The New York Times, April 15, 1972, p. 9.
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"and willing to cast Japan as a rival instead of an
.. 21

ally

Other problems have been raised by other prominent
Americans and their statements of attitude.

For exam

pIe, a row was touched off by the remarks of Defense
Secretary Helvin Laird when they were interpeted in
Japan as advocating the acquision by that country of
nuclear weapons.

The Defense Secretary, after noting

that the U.S., now provides Japan's nuclear shield,
added that:
I believe in that area of the world they
have a greater responsibility • • • I be
lieve that they should be bearing a greater
responsibility for the economic as well as
the military burden of defending peace and
maintainin~ the security of that area of
the world. 2
President Nixon's personal embarrassment of Sato
on a one-to-one basis, however, was probably in an immed
iate sense, the most damaging.
In Washington, President Nixon's unilateral
moves on China, the yen, 'and textiles last
year are seen to reflect hostility against
Premeir Eisaku Sato, who reneged on his
1969 promise to curb textile exports after
Nixon pledged Okinawa's return. But to the
Japanese, it was not their 'lameduck'
premier, but Japan that was ignored. The
2l Ibid •
2,2 The Japan Times, l-1ay 21, 1972, p. 4.
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Nixon 'shocks' are regarded as a national
humiliation. 23
When Prime Minister Sato was asked for his response
as he sat watching a worldwide broadcast over tele
vision of the Nixon visit to Peking, he replied "dis
dainfully" that "President Nixon himself claims it's
an epoch-making event. II
sarcasm he added:

Then, lIin a voice iced with

'If he says so, how can we dispute

it?,"24
The response to Nixon's China-shock among the
leading candidates seeking to replace Sato in July
of 1972 was quite uniform.

Sato's own choice, Foreign

Minister Takeo Fukuda. replied that as:
far as President Nixon's visit to China
is concerned, I certainly welcome it.
But the way it was done, in the sudden,
abrupt ~anner-- is not something I
really appreciate . • • it should never
be repeated. 25

,

A second major contender and the man who replaced Sato
as Prime Minister was Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of Inter
national Trade and Industry.

He observed that the:

Japanese are a very cautious people. The
kind of move Mr. Nixon made to Red China
without reference to Japan-- this is not
23The Harold International Tribune, April 26,
1972, p."47
24Newsweek. ~1arch 6, 1972. p. 4.
25 Ibid ., May 15, 1972, pp. 44-45.
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the way we would have done it. We
would have given you advance notice.
Courtesy is something. Orientals
'
respect. 26
A third contender for the pqst was former Foreign
Minister l-1asayoshi Ohira, who f€-9t'rectly noted that in:
the international sphere, .changes are in
order. From now on, Japan will not be able
to depend too much on the U.S., and I be
lieve the u.s. desires Japan to be more
self-supporting . • • The U.S. does not
have the power anymore to limitlessly
assist various countries around the globe
with its goodwill. We have developed our
national power and the U. S·. wants to reduce
her over-commitment. These two factors
will work as an impetus to change the
U.S.-Japanese relationship.27
A

fourth high-ranking Japanese official

call~d

President Nixon's China-shock a Pearl Harbor in re
verse.

He added t.hat the abrupt "announcement set

back Japanese-American relations by ten years. u28
In part, the American initiative with China can
be seen as a negative reaction to the economic threat
from Japan.

The Japanese government has estimated that

by 1980, Sino-Japanese trade could reach $3,200 million.-i:tJ

What Japan fears is that an American entry into the China
market, especially into the areas of machine tools,
26 Ibid •
27 Ibid •
28The New York Times, August 4, 1971, p. 1.
'2,9

Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 4.
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aircraft and generators, Will threaten their position.
Some Japanese expect

Sino-~erican

trade within three

years to reach $200 million.
To many Japanese it would appear today that, after
"':.

'

tl

'

having been forced into the Ame'rican picture of con
taining China throughout the 1950's and 1960's, the
United States had now blithely turned its back, leaving
Japan alone, in a precarious position to find its own
solutions to the Cold War riddle.

Politically and

psycho1ogica11y:J
American-Japanese ties are more important
to the Japanese than to the Americans, and
this the Japanese sense and resenti eco
nomically, the relationship now favors
the Japanese, and this the Americans in
creasingly begrudge.~
Therefore, while the United States has attempted
to force through an economic readjustment between the
two countries, the Japanese have been moving to redress
the political, psychological and military imbalance.
The net affect upon Japan has, in some ways, been
highly bene·ficia1..

While the American initiative towards

China has left a brightly lit path for Japan to follow,
the Soviet Union has also become less intractable to
Tokyo.

While relations between China and Japan may soon
30Brzezinski, p. 270.
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be normalized, relations between Japan and the Soviet
Union may soon see a signing of a peace treaty and
other mutually beneficial actions.
In addition, the

ne~v

independent policy has ob
~',

'

".

tained for Japan other dip10mat.ic

~bjectives.

On

February 19, 1972, Japan and the ?.1ongo1ian People IS
Republic announced the establishment of diplomatic
relations.

This \vas the first time that Japan had es

tab1ished diplomatic relations \'lith a Communist country
in Asia..

Tokyo has also since the Nixon ushocks,"

been una'fraid to open contacts with both North Vietnam
and North Korea.

As in the case of a Japanese de1e

gation to Hanoi and without informing Washington before
hand, the Sato- adm::.nistration in February and March of
1972 began moving towards the recognition of Bangladesh,
a country to which up to that time the u.S. had, totally
ignored.

At the conclusion of the Sapporo Olympics, the

head of the North Korean delegation stayed on in Japan
to host a series of lavish receptions to honor the newly
formed Korea-Japan Export and Import Corporation.

Simu1

taneous1y, Socialist Governor Ryokichi Minobe invited a
group of ranking North Koreans to pay an unprecedented
visit to Tokyo.
These actions are
Japan nOv1 fee ls the

~,

obvious indication that

u. s. is probably no longer totally
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reliable.

Shocked at being excluded in a major policy

alteration which drastically affected Japan itself, the
Japanese now fear being played off against China.
The Nixon initiative toward Peking vio
lated the spirit, if not the letter, of
the principle of joint consultation, and
it is quite likely that in the future it
will be more difficult for the" two capi
tals to concert their policies. 31
_~eonelusie:A,

Nixon's policies tovvards China will be,

in the long run, qood for the American interest even if
it only allows the united States to escape its own con
tainment policy which rigid anti-Communism demanded.

The

United States has now found new flexibility in foreign
policy which previously it had denied itself.

In part,

this new flexible position was born of necessity, since
the United States in the 1970's finds it no longer has
quite the ability to pressure others into a partnership
of its own will.

31 Ibid ., p. 272.

CHAPTER VI
JAPAN I S ROLE IN ASIA
To an important degree Japan fears too close an
association with the United States in the post-Sato
world.

The Japanese fear being linked to the American

war effort in Vietnam, which it is felt, could taint
Japan's future role as the re-builder of Asia.

The

Japanese already suffer from a somewhat tarnished image
in Asia.

Resentment and envy has come from Japan's

ruthless investment practices, from the attitudes and
practices of Japanese businessmen abroad, from its un
fair trading methods, from its often smug or superior
attitude towards other Asian trading nations, from its
refusals to liberalize controls on imports of foreign
capital and goods,
in economics. l

an~

most of all, from its very success

Equally important to Japan is its lingering image
from the Second World War.

The animosity that Japan had

built in this earlier period lingers on not only in Asia
but also in Europe and throughout the world.

Even in

Okinawa (a part of Japan itself prior to and during the
1

Far Eastern

. . .

Econom~c

Rev~ew,

Apr~l

8, 1972, p. 21.
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war), animosity and fear exist'.

Only one week before

reversion another atrocity had been reported by the
Okinawan media in which Japanese military forces had
apparently killed Okinawan civilians in the closing
stages of the war.

Other world-wide events, such as the

Lod Airport suicide attack in Israel by Japanese ex
tremists in May of 1972,

2

'

resulting in 26 deaths, have

served to keep memories of the extreme devotion once held
by the Japanese to old causes, still alive.
In addition to certain other signs of independence
recently displayed, Japan has moved to assume part of
the "leadership" void in IIfree li Asia, left by the American
withdrawal.

An example of this came on February 17,

1972, when the Japanese government offered Tokyo as a
site for a possible summit meeting between the Pakistani
President, Zu1fikar Ali Butto, and the Bang1adish Prime
Minister, Shekh Mujikur Rahman.

In late February of

1972, in another example of "leadership initiative" and
its drawing avlay from dependency on the United States,
Japan signed with France an agreement calling for joint
nuclear research and development.
2

Following the Lod Airport terrorist attack in
Israel, Japanese businessmen and tourists had to be 'evacu
ated from Puerto Rico to the u.s. mainland. Officials
feared retaliation for the 14 Puerto Ricans killed at the
Lod Airport by the three Japanese terrorists. See The
Japan Times, June 1, 1972.
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The search by Japan for new sources of fuel comes
with an increased reluctance to continued dependence on
the Middle East as a major source of oil.

In their

search, the Japanese have concentrated on possible sources
close to home.

Recently, Japan financed a ten million

dollar loan to Burma in an oil-drilling venture'that has
produced exploration off the Burma coast in the Tenasserim
area east of Ranqoon.

There has even been talk in Japan

of a trans-Andean pipeline which presumably would bring
oil to the West Coast of South America for shipment by
freighter to Japan. 3 However, it is in Indonesia, as
Asia's only major oil producer,4 that Japan places its
real hopes.

On May 14, 1972, Japan and Indonesia

jointly announced that the former country will provide a
loan of some $218 million to help finance oil develop
ment projects.

In return, Japan was promised a steady

supply of low-sulphur Indonesian oil through the next
3\
'
\'l'he New York Times, April 9, 1972, Section III.
p. S.

~

~tn March of 1972, in a display of some unity,

thdone,~a, Malaysia
declar~rthe Malacca

and Singapore suggested they might
Straits joint inland waters (in
order to control pollution and navagational hazards).
The Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain
all joined Japan in protest. The only great power to
oppose the suggestion was China. The action on the part
of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, in addition to
other factors, may also be linked to a regional aware
ness to the growth of Japanese influence in the area.
See The New York Times, March 13, 1972, p. 9.
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ten years.

Moreover, an important discovery of fuel by

Japan outside of the Soviet Union would greatly reduce
the effectiveness of the Russian inducement in the
Siberian project.
Japan is currently also investing in other under
developed regional areas.

Once new agricultural sources

have been located and secured, Japan will have eliminated
another important area of dependency on the United
States, which in the past, supplied a high proportion of
these necessary agricultural goods to Japan.

The Japanese

expect such countries as Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia,
and Thailand to be able to provide these goods more
5
cheaply than does the U.S.
The United States has in the
past been the largest provider to Japan of such items,
with an annual sales of over $1,000 million.

In terms of

major future Japanese investment, concentration will be
in both China and South Korea for general agricultural
items, Taiwan particularly for sugar, bananas, pineapples
and tea, North Vietnam for corn, animals and feeds,
South Vietnam for general investments, and Thailand,
where the Japanese investment already doubles that of the

u.S.
5The Japan Times, June 7, 1972, p. 10.
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In 1970, the greatest amount of world-wide aid
from Japan went to South Korea, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Hongkong, and Taiwan, in that order. 6

Each

of these three countries accounted for over 40 percent
(

of Japan's total world-wide ou'tflow of aid.

In mid

1971, Japan was in the process of ,'increasing aid to
Indonesia, Hongkong, and South Korea. 7

The lack of in

crease in assistance to Taiwan and the Philippines can be
explained, in the case of the former, by an improvement
in relations with China, and in the case of the
Philippines, by a general worsening of relations.
Japan has been one of the most unpopular countries
to attend the recent United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development
1972.

(l~CTAD),

which began in mid-April of

At the conference, the poorer nations attempted to

gain some adjustment of economic policies from the rich
nations.

China was partially successful in assuming

leadership of the poorer nations, which included many
from Asia.

Although Japan supplied the world's second

highest amount of total aid for 1971 ($1800 million),
or 0.93 percent of Japan's Gross National Product and
well abcve the 0.76 percent average,8

Tokyo was

6Far Eastern Economic Review, April 15, 1972, p.~ 48.
7 Ibid •
8The Japan Times, Hay 14, 1972, p. 3.
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criticized for its use of commercial credits rather
than grants and concessional loans.

Moreover, govern

ment loans from Japan have in the past been offered at
3.6 percent, a relatively high rate, with the world
average at only 2.7 percent. 9 The underdeveloped nations
have also criticized Japan's "economic aggression,"
since government aid rose by a mere 5 percent in export
credits.and capital investment, while private aid rose
by 44 percent. lO
In 1972, relations between Japan and the
Philippines, much like recent Japan-U.S. relations, was
at its lowest point since the Second World War.
President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and the

Ambassador of Japan, Toshio Urabe, recently conferred
over the growing anti-Japanese feeling among Filipinos.
Following the conference, many Filipinos criticized
Marcos for buckling unaer pressure.

The critics charged

that Japan had threatened to withdraw all financial as
sistance from the Philippines if anti-Japanese feelings
continued. ll

Much like the rest of Asia, Japan is the

object of distrust and fear among many Filipinos.

This

9Far East Economic Review, April 15, 1972, p. 48.
lOIbid.
lIThe Japan Times, April 4, 1972, p. 1.

III

negative reaction against yapan explains much of the
'recent rise in pro-American,feelings.

An example of

the new orientation in Filipino attitudes is seen in the
rapid growth of a Filipino organization claiming five
t

million members, desiring to make the Philippines
America's 51st state. 12
In contrast, Japan-Korean relations seem currently
more solid.

It is doubtful that in the near future

Tokyo would to any degree shift its support from Seoul
to Pyongyang.

Several factors support this conclusion:

(1) Japan has since 1965 recognized Seoul as the "sole
legitimate government of Korea"; (2) tiqht financial
relations exist between Tokyo and Seoul; (3) South
Korea has a strong lobby with Japan's political leader
ship; and, (4) South Korea has not been left exposed
from the Nixon trip to China to the same degree, as has
Taiwan.

Although trade between Japan and North Korea

continued to grow, doubling in value in 1971 and 1972,
it fell far behind Japanese-South Korean trade.

In

1971, trade with North Korea was valued' at $60 million,13
while Japanese trade with South Korea was about $1,000
million.
l2 Ibid ., May 14, 1972, p. 3.
13
..
Far East Econom1c Rev1ew, February 12, 1972, p. 33.

112

Relations between the "twolf Vietnams is considered
secondary to that of Japanese-Korean relations.

On

February 11, 1972, Japan dispatched two diplomats to
Hanoi in the first government mission to that country.
One result from the effort was to increase trade between
the two countries, which in 1971, totaled at a value of
only $17 million (but sho'\ved a strong increase of 30.8
percent).

14

Japan's position in South Vietnam, as men

tioned above, is a careful one, hoping for future invest
ments but much contented with great economic gains al
ready achieved.

Japan looks hopefully forward to an ex

pected role of providing great economic rehabilitation in
both North and South Vietnam following the war.
Until the reversion of Okinawa, Japan had terri
torial claims against all of the Great Powers except
the European Community.

Following reversion, the pro

blem of Okinawa changed from acquisition to administra
tion, i.e., reversion changed only the nature of the pro
blem in U.S.-Okinawa (Japan) relations.
Territorial claims between China and Japan are com
plicated by the inclusion of Taiwan as a part of the
issue.

The outstanding territorial problem between the

three nations arose when oil deposits
14

wer~

discovered in

The Japan Times, April 8, 1972, p. 9.
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November of 1970 off the China coast in the Senkaku
(Tiao-yu) Island group.

Claims to the Senkaku Islands

have also been made by South Korea.

The islands are un

inhabited and had had little real value until the oil
discovery.

International law is unclear on the subiect

and only urges the parties to meet and discuss the pro
blem.

Although American companies have often in the

past joined with their Japanese counterparts to hunt for
and develop oil discoveries,15 the

u.s.

government, not

wishing to get involved in the argument, has warned
several American oil companies not to become involved
in explorations in the disputed region.
The Senkaku Islands are situated at about the
same distance from the northeastern tip of Taiwan as
from the southern part of the Ryukyu Island chain
(Japanese controlled since May 15, 1972).

The islands,

however, are about twice that distance from China proper
and about four times that distance from the maior Japanese
island of Kyushu.

Since Japan claims the Senkakus are

included as part of the Ryukyu Islands reverted by the
United States on May 15, 1972, the Japanese had hoped for
a stronger American statement in their favor.

The

American position has been, however, that the problem
15
For example, see Japan Report, Vol. XVII, No. 17,
September 1, 1971, p. 8.
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should be settled by the countries concerned.
~he

Japanese government has

thre~tened

Although

to take a hard

line (for example, by the strengthening of naval patrols
in the vicinity), it is likely that an eventual compromise
will be reached by all concerned.

An example in modera

tion was made by the Japan Times, which advised that
although there:
is absolutely no question about the terri
torial status of the Senkaku Islands • • •
since it is the oil that has brought forth
the fallacious claims to Taipei and Peking,
we should not close our ears-- aside from
the territorial issue-- to the possibilities
of carrying out a joint international ex
ploration of the seabed resources in the area
around Japan's Senkaku Islands. 16
The People's Republic of China, like Japan, imports
oil from the Middle East.

Also, as in the case of Japan,

the Chinese need for oil in the near future is projected
to expand greatly.

Regarding the inclusion of the

Senkaku Islands as part of the Okinawa reversion, the
Chinese position has been that the United States which
occupied,
Japan's Okinawa after World War II, should
return Okinawa to Japan completely and un
conditionally. But it has no right at all
to include China's terri~ory Taioyu Island
and other islands under its illegal occupa
tion in the 'area of reversion. '17

l6Th~ Japan Times, March 10, 1972, p. 14.
l7peking Review, January 7, 1972, p. 14.
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In July of 1970, the Chinese charged that a Ryuku
coastal patrol ship had sailed to the Senkaku Islands
and "illegally set up markers there indicating they be
long to the Ryuku group. n

•

,By also. including the is

lands in Japan's "air defense',

~dentification

zone,"

Japanese "militarism is once again trying to occupy and
annex China's territory by armed force. n18
One of China's first actions following its accep
tance into the United Nations was to accuse Japan of
plundering China's coastal resources.

On March 3, 1972,

Japan was accused in the General Assembly's Committee on
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor of ' comb in
ing with the United States and Taiwan to plunder China's
coastal seaded.

An Chin-yuan, the delegate from China,

declared that:
The United States is to this date forci
bly occupying China's territory in Taiwan
Province and of late it has colluded "~li th
the Jap8nese reactionaries and used the
fraud of the reversion of Okinawa in an at
tempt to conclude into Ja~pan 1 s territory the
Taioyu (Senkaku) and other islands pertain
.ing to China's Taiwan Province.
The conflict over the Senkaku Islands includes not
only Japan and tbe People's Republic of China.
Nationalist government of Taiwan also claims the
l8 Ibid •
19 The Japan {rimes" March 5 1 19721 p. 1.

The
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territories for "China."

As in the case of Japan, Taiwan

has tried to influence the United states into taking a
stand in its favor on the islands issue, and like Japan,
has failed.

On April 10 and 11, 1971, Chinese and

Chinese-Americans went into the streets of Washington,
D. C. , and other American cities in support of both
Taiwan's and China's claims to the islands (in direct
'
) • 20
OppOS1. t'10n t 0 Japanese c la1ms

On May 23rd, a full

page advertisement appeared appealing to President Nixon
and the members of Congress urging the American govern
ment to:

(1) disavow any claims that the Senkaku Is

lands as ever being any part of the American administered
Ryukyu Islands; (2) recognize Chinese sovereignty over the
islands; and, (3) censure actions by the Japanese govern
ment which "viol~tes" Chinese sovereiqnty.21
The problem of the Senkaku Islands has been com
I

plicated by the larger and more important question in
Japanese politics of the status of Taiwan itself, especial
ly since the Nixon visit to China.

The Japanese, follow

ing the Nixon "China-shock," feared a new American policy
of rapprochement with China, leaving Japan behind and
isolated.

The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek

20The New York Times. April 12. 1971, p. 9.
21~.,
bOd
May 2 3, 1 971. p. 30.
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on Taiwan has long been the Far Eastern symbol of the
Cold War.

While the

84-ye~r

old Chiang has ruled the

Republic of China for over a quarter of a century,
Japanese foreign policy can no longer afford to await
the pleasure of his retirement "a·n'd a possible change in
policy.

Taiwan is the most important problem to be

solved prior to any normalization in Japan-China rela
tions.
The United States is not the only maior power to
have altered its policies towards China and against
Taiwan.

For example, Great Britain on March 13, 1972,

decided to remove its official representation from
Taipei and to enter into full-scale relations with
Peking.

At the same time, the British acknowledge lithe

position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a pro
vince of the People's Republic of China. n22
How important is Taiwan to Japan's economy?
Taiwan has generally sold to Japan agricultural products
in return for processed raw materials, machinery, and
iron and steel.

Lately, the increased industrialization

in Taiwan has commensurably increased Taiwanese exports
of new goods (e.g., light industry ftems), to Japanese
markets.

Total trade with Taiwan was $1.034 million iq

22The Japan Time~, March 17, 1972, p. 16.
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1971, exceeding China-Japan trade.

It was also re

ported that more Japanese tourists were going in 1971
to Taiwan than any other country in the world.

In 1971,

the total number of Japanese tourists going to Taiwan
was 255,000, up 44.1 percent from the 1970 total.

At

the same time, the total number of American tourists
going to Taiwan in 1971 dropped by 8.5 percent from
23
1970.
There is some disagreement over the amount of
Japanese investment in Taiwan.

Some "conservative"

estimates put Japan's investment levels for 1971 at
about $100 million. 24

For the single year 1971,

Japanese investment dropped from the 1970 level of
51 investment cases with a total value of $28.5 million,
to only 18 cases of investment proiects totaled in value
at $12.4 ml.·11l.·on.25

Never th e 1 ess, J apan l.n
. 1971 s tOll
l.

provided the world's largest amount of technological aid
to Taiwan (79 out of 102 total cases of technological
cooperation contracts).26

The significance of these

23Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1971,

p. 67.
24 Ibid •
25

The Japan Times Weekly, Harch 18, 1972, p. 9".

26
. The Japan Times, May 22, 1972, p. 12.
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figures is that while

Japane~e

trade and investment in

Taiwan for 1971 displayed a downswing reflecting the
change in Japan's attitudes on the "Taiwan question,lI
the total effect was not as drastic as some had pre
viously suggested might occur.
On October 8, 1971, Peking spelled out a modified
set of conditions in any normalization of relations with
Japan. 27 The text of conditions was enumerated in a
joint communique signed the previous day in Peking with
a group of visiting legislators from Japan.

The joint

communique agreed that relations should be established
between Japan and China "at the earliest possible
date," and on the basis that Japan drop its relations
with the Nationalist qovernment on Taiwan including the
abrogation of the peace treaty.

Officially, the Peking

government is still at war with Tokyo, having

nev~r

signed a peace treaty following the conclusion of hos
tilities.

The joint communique showed a moderating

Chinese position, since they did not mention the ques
tion of war reparations, possibly amounting to billions
of dollars.

Neither did they mention the question of

the Japanese-American defense treaty.
27 The New York Times, October 4, 1971, pp. 1 and.
3.
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In the following month of November, in an inter
view with Moto Goto, the managing editor of Asahi
Shimbun (one of Japan's major newspapers), Premier

Chou En-lai of China reiterated the basic 1nd primary
importance of setting the Taiwan question prior to
Japan-China normalization. 28 The Chinese Premier
told the Japanese newspaper editor that:
it is necessary for the Japanese govern
ment to outline a clear-cut attitude on
the Taiwan question • • . the Japan
Taiwan treaty must be abrogated \vithout
fail.
The Japanese Socialist Party, the Komeito party, and the
Democratic Socialist Party, on the following day, sub
mitted a resolution that would give recognition to
China on Peking's terms. 29

The Japanese Communist Party

gave only "reluctant support" to the measure.
Specifically, Peking's demands for normalization
are all related to Taiwan and are based on China's
"three principles":

first, to recognize the government

of the People's Republic of China as the only legal
government of China; second, to declare that Taiwanese
self-determination or independence movements are un
acceptable; and third, to declare the peace treaty of

28Ib~d.,
Noverob e r9, 1971 , p. 17 .
•
29 Ibid •
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1951 bet\veen Japan and Taiwan invalid.

~ost dist~r~ing stateme~ts

One of the

by a leader

I

of Japan ever made public to China since the 1951 peace
treaty with Taiwan was made 'by Prime Minister Sato in
November of 1969.

After having'\'inet with President Nixon,

Sate declared that the "security in the Taiwan area to
.
f
'~n the
actor
be a most ~mportant

.

secur~ty

0

f

Japan.',.30

The reaction to Sato's speech in the Chinese press was
instantaneous.

For example. the newspapers Jen-min Jih

pao, Hung-ch'i and Chieh-fang-chun Pao pointed out in
their editorial:
It has long been our consistent policy to
develop diplomatic relations with all
countries on the basis of the five prin
cipals of peaceful co-existence. but on no
account can we tolerate the invasion and
occupatior:, of our sacred terri tory by any
imperialism or social-imperialism. We are
determined to liberate Taiwan. u.S. im
perialism and Japan militarism had bet~Ir
consider this paragraph more carefully.
In another example, the Chinese media claimed that
at the Sato-Nixon meeting in November of 1969, the two
leaders had decided to go,
30For the complete text see The Ne~ York Times,
November 22, 1969, p. 14.
31"u.s. Nevlsman on Japanese ~1ilitarists' Territorial
Designs on Taiwan," Survey of China 1-1ainland Press, NQ.
4592 (from Hong Kong Press, Ta Kung Pao, on February 2,
1970), Hongkong: u.s. Consulate General, February 5,1970,
p. 128.

122
so far as to include China's sacred ter
ritory Taiwan province within Japan's
sphere of incluence, flagrantly clamour
ing that they would prevent the Chinese
people from liberating Taiwan. At the
same time, Eisaku Sato also sent his
brother Nobusuka Kishi, a first-class
war criminal, to Taiwan for conspira
torial activities. All of these facts
have further exposed the rabid ambitions
of the Japanese reactionsaries to re
occupy China's sacred territory Taiwan. 32
Two years later, in 1972, the official Chinese
position had not changed:
Sato reaffirmed time and time again after
his talks with Nixon that the 'U.S.-Japan
security system is needed,' that 'the
system will be persisted in,' and that
'it can be stated explicitly that Taiwan
is not excluded from the area3~f the U.S.
Japan security treaty system.
Where Chinese attitudes had altered concerned the
recent thawing in Soviet-Japanese relations, awakening
the worst in China's fears.

Peking accused Japan of

conspiring with the Soviets on the anti-China issue,
and even being instigated by the Russians to occupy by
force "China's sacred territory,lI Taiwan. 34
To a great extent, the Chinese were able to use
the Nixon "China-shock" to their advantage and against
32 Ibid ., "Reactionary Japanese Government Rabidly
. Opposes China in Collusion with u.s. Imperialism," (New
'China News Agency-English, Peking, December 27, 1969)",
No. 4569, January 5, 1970.
33"
Peking Review, No.4, January 28, 1972, p. 21.

34Ibi.d~, No.6, February 11, 1972, p. 19.
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the Japanese.

During the Nixon visit, the Chinese

toughened their recent language against the exposed
"Japanese, including that concerning the Taiwan
question:
The Japanese militarists have become more
frenzied since the latter part of 1971 in
the"ir sinister manoeuvers to annex China's
Taiwan Province. They have whipped up pu
blic opinion and recruited followers for
creating an 'independent Taiwan' and even
chosen the main actors for the performance.
Nearly all these dirty moves are directly
or indirectly connected with Japanese
Prime Minister Sato, Foreign Minister
Fukuda and arch war criminal Kishi .
The Japanese reactionaries • . • are
attempting to create an 'independent
Taiwan' through a bunch of Chinese trai
tors in their pay, so as to reduce Taiwan
to a Japanese colony again. Such a tactic
is indeed identical with the devilish
stratagem of Japanese imperialists in
rigging up 'Hanchukuo' more than 40 years
ago! Sato and his ilk . • . are wor.thv
° 1 es 0 f
°
d 1SC1P
To]o.
• • . 35
o

In response to the attacks from China, from the
opposition parties, and from many groups and organiza
tions in Japan, Prime Minister Sato on March I, 1972,
modified his previous position saying that now he fully
recognized Peking's territorial claims over Taiwan.

This

statement represented a major shift within "Sato's para
dox."

While forces were building in Japan for normali

za.tion of relations with China, the pre-conditions
35Ibid ., Nos. 7-8, February 25, 1972, pp. 27-28.
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set by Peking meant nothing less than a complete Japanese
sell-out of Taiwan.

The Nixon "China-shock" gave Sato

the pretext of doinq what he could never had dared be
fore: move in bold directions' towards a China accomrnodaI

tion and away from the

tattered"~ies

with Taiwan, an

issue that was splitting the intern'al political cohesion
within Japan and within the Liberal Democratic Party.

In

1971, Sato had admitted that it was:
~ot

an overstatement to say that Japan re
lations with China form the core of Japanese
diplomacy, but he could offer no formula
whereby Japan could improve relations with
Peking while maintaining relations with
Taiwan. 36
Unfortunately for Sato, his respite had 'come too
late, his political support at home long since having
dissipated in strength.

In addition, China refused to

deal with Sato or his Government, preferring to wait
until his successor (Tanaka) had been named.

The Nixon

"China-shock" had inadvertently helped Mr. Sato out of his
paradox over the Taiwan commitment, but somewhat ironi
cally it had also had helped him out of office.

__ York
_ _ T"1mes, uanuary,
T
1 1971 , p. 1 •
36 __
The New

CHAP~ER:

VII

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
Several of the most impo~tant problems between
Japan and China in '1972 were:

(l) the Japan-U. S.

Security TreatYi (2) the growth of Japanese militarism;
(3) Japan's relations with Taiwan and South Korea; (4)
the economic expansion of Japan, particularly in Asia;
and, (5) the fear in China of any economic, political
or military understanding between Japan and the Soviet
Union.
To some degree, China and Japan share the same
Confucian culture and conunon racial characteristics.
But in many ways Japan has had more in
conunon with Europe than with China. Per
haps this dissimilarity is more obvious
to the Asian eye than to the European. l
Nevertheless, China's relations with Japan have, since
the early 1960's, been better than with either of the
other two Asian Great PO'tvers.

In 1957, Chou En-lai had

said that the Chinese did not object to Japan's relations
with the United States, but "what they did not approve of
was their one-sidedness and Japan's refusal to develop
lpyong-choon, p. 343.
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friendly relations with China."2

By 1958, the Chinese

government had:
adopted an attitude of uncompromising op
position to the Japanese government and
encouraged a mass struggle against it.
The reasons for this shift may be sought
in the Chinese calculations about the im
possibility of developing relations with
Japan without a prior expulsion of
American influence, their hopes about
the possibilities of realizing this ob
jective, and their faith in their capa
city to impress Japan with China's new
power. 3
\

During the mid-1960's, China's image and influence
in Japan suffered, primarily from Peking's own behavior.
with the main exception of the extreme left-wing organi
zations, Japanese public opinion was adversly affected
by such factors as China's development of nuclear wea
pons, its wars of liberation, its real or supposed role
with the Communist Party in Indonesia, and the results
from the. excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

Japan-

China relations were also negatively affected with the
coming to power of Sato.
Yet in the following four years Peking's
concern with the more immediate problems
of the Indochina war, border clashes with
the Soviet Union, and the Cultural Revolu
tion tended to push Japan into the back
ground of its foreign policy considerations.
2

Dutt, p. 233.

3 .

Ibid., p. 234.
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When the Chinese did discuss Japan it
was usually in terms of American or
Soviet 'collaboration. ,4
In addition, the:
major Soviet diplomatic and economic
offensive throughout Southeast Asia
and Moscow' 'S call for an Asian col
lective security pact were both inter
preted in Peking as an elaborate
policy of containment dependent on a
Moscow-Tokyo axis.5
What China specifically fears is that Japan may
decide to meet what Prime Minister Sato has called,
Japan's lIinternational obligations."

In an article for

the Chinese newspaper Jen-min Jih-pao in January of.1970,
Peking outlined its fears of Japanese power-emergence. 6
The Sato administration has always fol
lowed u.S. imperialism, colluded with the
Soviet revisionists and reactionaries of
all countries, remained hostile toward
China, and opposed to the national demo
cratic revolutionary movements of the
peoples of all Asian countries. The Sato
administration continues to 'uphold' the
'Japan-U.S. 'Security Pact,' or the Japan
u.S. military alliance. which points its
spearhead against socialist China and the
countries in Asia, steps 'up Japan-U.S.
military collusion under the camouflage
of the 'return of Okinawa,' and further
ties Japan on the chariot of aggression
4

Saywel1, p. 513.

5 Ibid .
6"Refutation of Sato's Clamor for So-called
'Fulfillment of International Obligations,' II Survey 2i.
China Mainland Press, No. 4596 (Peking Jen-min Jin-}?aO,
January 30, 1970), Hongkong: U.Se Consulate General,
February 13, 1970, pp. 122-123.
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of u.s. imperialism. In response to
Nixon's so-called 'New Asian Policy' the
Sato administration actively serves as the
military police in Asia in a futile attempt
to round up the reactionaries of all coun
tries to establish a clique of military ag
gression backed by the United States and
using Japan as the 'backbone' to act inim
ically against the people of China and
other Asian countries. This is the 'inter
national obligations' which the Japanese
reactionaries want to 'fulfill'!
Waving the banner of 'sovereignty and de
fense,' Japanese reactionaries energetically
expand armament and prepare for war, clamor
ing to engage in 'localized' wars of aggres
sion by using the 'Self-Defense Force (Note:
i.e., the Japanese Army, Navy and Air Force)
as the principal force' with the support of
u.s. imperialism. They also clamored about
sending their fleet to 'defend' the Strait
of Malacca and establish their power at sea.
These are the 'international obligations'
which Japanese reactionaries want to 'ful
fill' !
Japanese reactionaries included Chinese terri
tory, Taiwan Province, Korea, Indo-china, etc.,
into Japan's sphere of 'defense' and clamored
to use force to hinder the Chinese people in
. their liberation of their own territory of
Taiwan Province and to engage in aggressive
adventures against Korea and other areas.
These are the 'international obligations'
which the Japanese reactionaries want to
'fulfill' !
Waving the banner of 'cooperation' and 'aid
for development' the Japanese reactionaries
engage in economic expansion and infiltration
against countries in Southeast Asia, rob them
of their resources, ruin the local national
industries, control their economy, and striv~
to include these countries into Japan's sphere
of colonization so as to renew their dream of
'Greater East Asian Sphere of Co-prosperity.'
These are the 'international obligations' which
the Japanese reactionaries want to 'fulfill'!
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Memory is still fresh in the minds of the
people in Asia and the Pacific area about
the Japanese militarists' launching of the
war of aggression and their crimes of slaugh
tering and robbing the people of Asia. They
are highly vigilant against the aggressive
designs of the Japanese reactionaries. Acts
of aggressive expansion by the Japanese reac
tionaries in Asia and the Pacific area can
only arouse strong resistance and counter
attack from the people in Asia and the Pacific
area which will make the Japanese reaction
aries encircled by the people of all countries.
Great leader Chairman ~1ao pointed out: 'Im
perialist wolves must remember, the era when
they were free to change the fate of mankind
and rape the countries in Asia and Africa has
gone forever and will never return.'
Japan is the only Asian nation which can clearly
offer both economic and military superiority to China's
self-image as the leader of Asia.
As a status-quo power bent on internal
development and the enhancement of re
gional stability through the maintenance
of non-communist neighbors, Tokyo pre
sents a long-t,erm obstacle to Peking's
regional influence a~bitions. Chinese
foreign-policy-makers seem particularly
sensitive to Japan's efforts at regional
leadership through such organizations as
the Asia-Pacific Council- (ASPAC) and its
hosting of a nunmer of re~ional conferences
beginning in 1966 • • • •
Japan 1 s military alliance with the United States has
long been a sore point with China.

This is basically

7S • w. Simon, "Some Aspects of China's Asian
Policy in the Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath,"
Pacific Affairs (Spring 1971), p. 30.

130
been because the alliance is seen by China as merely a
device for Japan to further its resumption of rearmament.
Now however, the situation may have reversed itself,
with the Security Treaty offering to China perhaps the
only viable alternative to complete Japanese rearmament.
Today, China faces a new problem of imponderable impor
tance:

the growing threat of cooperation between Japan

and the Soviet Union, far more dangerous to China than
any Japanese-American alliance.
If Japan does decide to rearm completely, there is
very little China can do to prevent it.

The alternatives

of the People's Republic of China to,
offset Soviet and American influence in
Japan is very limited, consisting primarily
of trade blandishments and appeals to
segments of the Japanese Communist and
Socialist Parties, neither of which has
much foreign policy leverage. 8
Chinese internal and external propaganda has always
distinquished between the rulers of Japan and the
Japanese people.

An

often quoted statement, made origin

ally in January of 1964 by Chairman Mao, demonstrates this:
Japan is a great nation. It will certainly
not allow U.S. imperialism to ride rough
shod over it for long. The last few years
have seen the constant broadening of the
patriotic united front of all strata the
Japanese people against U.S. imperialist
8

Ibid., p. 31.
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aggression, oppression and control. This
is the surest guarantee of victory in their
patriotic struggle agains~ U.S. imperial
ism. The Chinese people are convinced that
the Japanese people will be able to drive
the U.s. imperialists from their soil and
realize their aspirations for ind pendence,
democracy, peace, and neutrality. 9
More recently, in the case of Taiwan's status,
Peking's "people to people offensive" has stated that:
The Chinese people will never allow any
. outside interference in this matter. This
just stand of the Chinese people has en
joyed wide and resolute support from the
Japanese people. The Japanese people de
mand for the restoration of diplomatic re
lations between Japan and China and the
development of Japan-China friendship is
like a mighty torrent surging ahead irresis
tibly. Sato's deliberate design to antagonize
the Chinese people and carry out the 'two
Chinas' plot and his ambition to commit ag
gression on China's territory Taiwan are
doomed to fail.lO
.
Although less recently since the Nixon visit,
China has had in the past, the advantage of appealing as
a utopia to alienated'students and intellectuals. ll For
example, Peking claimed that after 1965, "a new leap
took place and a new situation appeared," as groups of
9"Japanese People's Just Patriotic Struggle
Against u.s. Imperialism Rolls On," Survey of China
Mainland Press, No. 4590 (Peking, January 27; 1970) ,
Hongkong: u.S. Consulate General, February 3, 1970,
p. 58.

10.
.
Pekl.ng Revl.ew, March 10, 1972, no. 10, p. 17.
11 .
Hl.nton, p. 234.

132
workers and students were organized to fight in the

struggle.

In many places

o~

J.apan, since lithe autumn

of 1967, the courageous and revolutionary Japanese
have engaged in'a series of fierce strug

people •

gles with the repressive reactionaries and armed police.,,12
In 1972, the extreme character of such organizations and
their violence had alienated most Japanese of any
sympathy.
The general policy of China had been to rollout
the red carpet for almost any visiting Japanese who
opposed Sato, in or out of government.

Inter-party

Communist relations between China and Japan retained,
in 1972, the hostile character established earlier in
the decade.

T~e

leaders of China had recognized ear

lier that they would have to work,
not through the JCP but through the
Socialist Party which was the dominant
opposition in the country and through
their trade union organization SOHYO.
Peking's task was facilitated by the
fact that both these organizations were
uncompromisingly against the military
alliance with the United States and the
retention of U.S. bases on Japanese soil
and were emotionally pro-Chinese. 13
Four recent developments have heightened Chinese
12
13

0
~.

,
c~t.,

p. 57 •

Du t t , P • 239.
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consternation over Japan ',s role in Asia:

(1) the

Sato-Johnson 1967 talks on Apian security: (2) the
Nixon Guam doctrine of mid-1969, increasing Japan's
role in Asia; (3) the NoverOber 1969 Sato-Nixon talks,
in which Taiwan's and South Korea's independence was
linked to Japan; and (4) the June 1970 Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty.

At a time when economic intercourse

is rapidly expanding between the two countries, China
remains jealous and in fear of Japanese diplomatic and
commercial successes in Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and
quite possibly, Siberia.

In addition, while Japan

fears China's nuclear weapons, the Chinese

~orry

con

tinuously over the possible remilitarization of Japan.
Moreover,

fo~lowing

the disasters of the "united

front" (conducted on official levels), the Peking
Government has since aligned itself with the revolu
tionary masses of various Asian countries.

Japan was

seen in China as only an Asian image of American
imperialism. 14
Another problem of Japan-China relations has
been the growing nationalism in both countries, which
may in the future hamper efforts to reach a solution
14 LaFeber, p. 144.
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of the important questions. lS

Largely, security in

Asia will depend upon the future course of Japanese
domestic politics and upon the ability of the ruling
governments to keep excessive nationalistic feelings
under IIcontrol.1I

Quite possibly,

the very considerable cultural and racial
affinity between China and Japan may one
day provide a basis for removing today's
conflicts. This would, of course, be con
tingent upon Japan's recognition of China's
claims to be the senior partner, and the
chances in the present decade of such a
Sino-Japanese rapprochement are very small

. . . .26

.

China's strength as both a conventional and nuclear
power has been a factor of Asian politics for some time.
The People's Republic of China's,
capability projected into the 1970's seems
formidable; a limited number of kiloton and
megaton \veapons relative to the U. S. and
the U.S.S.R., and a limited delivery capa
bility, yet one which could reach to other
parts of mainland Asia, Asiatic U.S.S.R.,
Japan and the Ryukyus, Taiwan and the
Philippines. 17
Yet, the critical question is of

'~intent,n

and the

desire to initiate aggression on the part of the regime
in China has yet to be proven a fact.

The conventional

15.:;oachim G1aubitz, "l·loscow-Peking-Tokyo: A
Triangle of Great Power Relations," Institute for the
Study of the U.S.S.R. Bulletin (June 1971), p.~.--16Ibl.0d ., p. 32.
17J • H. Buck, "Japan's Defense Options for the
1970's," Asian Survey (October 1970), p. 894.
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strength of the Chinese military against any other
Great Power is found in its defensive depth; less in
any offensive projection.

This has at least been the

general attitude of the Japanese and they seem little
worried, having developed a policy of nwait and see. nIB
Trade pressure, next to the political parties,
may be China's most powerful influence within Japan.
Although the Chinese position has basically always been
that economic intercourse and political relations could
never be separated, throughout the 1960's and into the
1970's, Japan has been able to hold economic intercourse
with China without solving the difficult political and
ideological questions.

During a speech to the Diet in

March of 1967, Prime Minister Sato said that his policy
vis-a-vis China would be to "separate politics from
economics. n19 In fact, however, this had been the policy
of Japan since the early 1950's.
Generally, the attitude of the average Japanese
businessman has been swayed by economic rather than
political considerations.

In addition, because,

of the large memberships and diverse com
positions of these associations, they are
18

Storry, p. 333.

--.

19The Japan T;mes, March 15 " 1967

P

. 1.
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not unanimous conqerning the China issue.
But the general attitude of. these busi
ness groups is to promote trade with
Communist China, but not officially to
recognize it. 20
The Chinese, on the other hand, "are so completely
~

swayed by political feelings that

th~y

have allowed

their distrust of Japan to enter 'into their considera
tion of commercial matters. n2l

For example, in 1962,

after having realized the growing economic power and
independence of Japan, Peking dropped its earlier con
ditions and again gave its consent to renew private
trade between the two countries. 22
In 1968, China for the first time insisted on
political statements being included within the annual
trade agreements.

It was from the Cultural Revolution

that the Chinese trade negotiators adopted a rigid and
doctrinaire attitude in trade dealings with

Ja~an.

The

general decline which Japanese-Chinese trade experienced
in that year was brought about since the Japanese were
unwilling to purchase China's exportable items (rice,
iron ores, tobacco and livestock).
20 Jan, p.
611.
21 Lee , p. 137.
22 Dutt , p. 254.
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but China could not export, was such materials as
coal and corn.

In addition, at the time Japan was fol

lowing a rigid economic policy.

Because of the re

gulations in the use of Export-Import Bank funds,
China was unable to borrow from Japan, turning to
Western Europe instead.
In April of 1970, China took a maior step in its
continuing attempts to influence Japan's trade policies.
Premier Chou En-lai declared the future would see
China refusing to have any dealings with foreign firms
who thereafter dealt \vith or invested in Taiwan or
South Korea. delivered weapons to South Vietnam, or
were partners with U.S.' firms.

liThe alacrity with which

the majority of Japanese firms complied with the
Chinese demands were surprising," and Peking "has at
its disposal an instrument with which to exert political
pressure upon Japan and influence her economic relations
with her neighbors.,,23
Upon returning from Peking in November of 1971,
a delegation of ranking Japanese businessmen reported
that trade between the two countries would grow, but
only gradually.

The influential character of the group's

23 G1 a 00°~tz, p. 28 •
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composition was a reflection of the qrowing importance
of the China trade to Japan's economy.
Yoshizane Iwasa, president of the Fuji
Bank, a member of the mission, said in
an interview that within the next two
or three years it would be difficult to
achieve a radically fast increase in
trade between China and Japan. However,
he forecast a 'gradual increase year by
year.' Mr. Iwasa said that the Chinese
had explained that they wanted to develop
their industry with their own initiative. 24
They want to stand on their own feet • • •
In February of 1972, the Japanese Government came
to a major policy alteration.

It was decided then to

approve future applications for Export-Import Bank
credits to China.

The Government had previously re

fused to permit use of the bank's funds for trade with
China because of a private promise to this effect made
by the late former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in a
letter to the Taipei Government in 1964.
Continued liberalization of trade policy seems to
be a part of Japan's future attitude with China.
The scope for economic cooperation appears
boundless. Japan has much to offer in
helping to develop the Chinese heavy,
petrochemical, synthetic fibre, and ele
tric power industries which are high on
China's economic plan. 25
24The New York Times, November 28, 1971, p. 1.
25 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 45.
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In 1971, total trade between China and Japan increased
9.4 percent over 1970.

Of 'this, Chinese exports of raw

silk doubled to become the top export item to Japan.
China's biqgest imports are iron and steel materials,
~',

"
chemicals, machines, and raw materials
for textile
manufacturing.
Trade between China and Japan is probably more
important to the former, since Japan has been accurnula
tinq a trade surplus, and with the exception of raw silk
and soy beans, none of the principal items imported
from China are in any real demand.

In fact, Japan must

find new items from China to import.
To boost exports to Japan, China needs
to follow international trade practices
in respect to pricing, quality control,
designing and shippinq. Richly endowed
with natural resources, it could meet
many of the needs of the humming Japanese
manufacturing industries if its products
were competitive-- if it really made the
decision to export them. 26
If this decision were made, Japan could help to in
dustrialize China, while the latter, in turn, could
supply badly needed natural resources.
It has, however, been the very success of Japan's
economy that has added to the problems of Japan-China
26 Ibid •
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relations.

One such aspect is:

Peking's fear that Japan is becoming a
paramount and anti-Chinese power in
Southeast Asia. Japan is Indonesia's
number one trading partner; she domi
nates Thailand's transportation, tex
tile, and iron and steel industries; and
is a leading economic power in such key
areas as Malaya, Burma, and even
Australia. The Japanese realize that
if any military is flashed in support
of this economic expansion, it will
arouse memories of the hated Japanese
occupation and Co-Prosperity Sphere in
Southeast Asia. The Chinese constantly
play on such memories, but so far with
out much effect. 27
The "Okinawanization of Japan" is seen as part
of a new phase in Japanese imperialism, edging closer
to outright militarism.

Peking sees the reversion of

Okinawa as part of the American policy of letting
Asians fight Asians.
Through the Okinawan 'reversion' fraud, the
United States and Japan hope to tone down
the struggle pf the Asian people, the
Japanese people in particular~ against the
U.S.-Japanese reactionaries.2~
To neutralize the actual or imagined military
threat from Japan, China, as one possibility, would un
officially like to see a four-power nonaggression pact
with the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan. 29

In

27LaFeber, pp. 146 and 178.
28 Pe k"1ng Rev1ew, January,
28 1972 , No. 4 ,pp. 2 0- 2 1.
29 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1972, p. 28.
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addition to with the fear of a remilitarized Japan,
also exists a fear of a Japan-Soviet alliance.

Given

the choice, China would unquestionably prefer the U.S.
Japan Security Treaty to any Moscow-Tokyo alliance.

It

is with the Soviet Union that China now competes in at
tracting Japan, followinq the qrowing Japanese disparity
with the U.S.

If the proposed Siberian project serves as

the greatest Soviet enticement, it is the northern ter
ritories issue that acts as the qreatest hinderance.
China continues to play to the latter theme, irritating
the Russians, while supportinq the demands of Japan.
One sympathizer of the Soviet Union concluded that the,
Chinese leaders are blackmailing Ja.pan's
ruling circles with the poeibly anti-Japanese
trend of the newly-emerging Chines(;~-U. S.
rapprochement. They domonstrate to the
Japanese ruling circles their blatant anti
Sovietism and solidarity on the 'Northern
territories' issue. the solidarity on \vhich
Japan may allegedly rely in bringing pres
sure to bear on the Soviet Union. 30

30 n. Yostokov, liThe Foreign Policy of the People's
Republic of China Since the Ninth Congress of the
Communist Party of China," International Affairs (January
1972), p. 31.

CHAPTER VIII
JAPAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
Throughout the post-war period and until the
Nixon visit to China, Russo-Japanese relations had
generally been poor.

Since the China-U.S. "detente,"

relations between the Soviet Union and Japan have
improved.

The improvement in relations with Japan has

come about from what can be termed a Russian "goodwill
offensive."

At a time when American-Japanese relations

are at their weakest point in the post-war era, Soviet
Japanese relations are at their strongest.
The Soviet Union had been a leader among those
Asian nations who did not favor the revitalization of
Japan following the conclusion of the Second World War.
A formal peace treaty between the two countries has
never been concluded.

Instead, a joint Russo-Japanese

"peace declaration" was signed on October 19, 1956.
Agreed to in the declaration was a technical end to the
state of war.
for:

The signinq of the

docl~ent

also provided

the opening of diplomatic and consular relations

between the two countries, Japan was to receive Soviet
support for united Nations membership,

~1oscow

was to

repatriate Japanese nationals, and both countries were
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to drop certain respective claims against the other.
Moreover, it was agreed that ,Japan and the Soviet
Union would begin talks for future trade agreements,
fisheries conventions, and hopefully, a formal treaty
t.

of peace.

"
While some of these.expectations
were even

tually realized (e.g., in a trade agreement signed in
1963 and extending through 1966, an estimated exchange
of some $700,000,000 worth of goods were called for);
as of mid-1972, a formal peace treaty had not yet been
.

s~gne

d •1

As in the case of China, strong economic ties

between Japan and the Soviet Union have not led·directly
to equally strong political ties.
Part of the recent Russian policy in Asia has
consisted of the Erezhnev Collective Security Plan.

At

a time when the shift in emphasis of Soviet foreign
policy has meant a relaxation of relations

wit~

Europe

and the United States in the West, the critical problem
of the Sino-Soviet

conflict~

remains.

After having

originally expressed his collective security plan at the
International Communist Party Conference in June of 1969,
Brezhnev, in a speech in March of 1971, again expressed
interest amid a "massive media campaign directed at
INegotiations designed to arrive at a formal
peace treaty are expected to begin in late 1972.
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building closer Soviet-Japanese relations. 1I2

Moreover,

after a period of apparent oblivion, the:
resurgence of this theme in the Soviet
media cdncides with the reactivation of
~1oscow I s Asian policy.
Diplomatic ef
forts toward closer relations are fore
seen. But no spectacular breakthroughs
in that direction should be expected
until presently prevailing circumstances
in the area undergo serious changes. 3
In April of 1971, at the 24th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, General Secretary
Brezhnev re-enumerated his collective security plan.

It

called for the prohibition in the exercising of military
power among Asian nations, the respect of national
sovereignty and nonaggression against other nations'
borders, the noninterference in other nations' domestic
affairs, and, the promotion of cooperation in economic
and other spheres based on equality and mutual benefit.
Advantageously amplifying this spirit, Radio Moscow on
May 16,1972 (the day following reversion), called on
Okinawa to be made free of nuclear weapons and to be
completely demi1itarized. 4
2

.

The Japan Times Weekly, May 27, 1972, p. 4.

3Jean Rio11ot. "Moscow and Asian Collective
Security," Radio Liberty Dispatch, October 14, 1971,
p. 1.
4

The Japan Times, r1ay 17, 1972, p. 1.
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The American reaction to the Brezhnev Collective
Security Plan, as publicly detailed by Assistant
secretary Marshall Green, was that a:
non-aligned Southeast Asia is a worthy
long-term goal; but there are a lot of
hurdles to get over before you get there,
and I feel that all of the leaders of
Southeast Asia, while recognizing that it
would be desirable to work tO~lard that
long-term goal, understand these diffi
cult problems that must be surmounted,
that neutrality, to be real, must be
5
based upon adequate defense and security.
A number of factors are, however, pushing the Soviet

Union to greater initiative.

With the recent vigor in

Sino-American relations,
Peking's reported flexibility on the
question of the normalization of Sino
Japanese relations, the current crisis
in United States-Japanese economic re
lations, and the current mood of Japanese
opinion are all factors that may further
strengthen Moscow's conviction that dip
lomatic action in Asia in this stage
should revolve around the Japanese
issue. 6
Responding in March of 1972, Prime Minister Sato, at a
plenary session of the House of Councellors, expressed
interest in studying the Brezhnev plan for the collective
secur1·ty

0 fA·
S1a.

7

5

.

.

Marshall Green, Ass1stant Secretary for East AS1an
and Pacific Affairs, II Interviewed on ~1eet the Press, n
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1712,
April 17, 1972, p. 575.
6Riollot, p. 3.
7See The Japan Times, ~1arch 2, 1972, p. 1.
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In part, the Soviet qood\'lill-offensive aimed at
Japan is defensive in nature.

The Russians fear a change

in Japanese attitudes following the Nixon visit to
China.

More specifically, they fear the American ini

tiative towards China will stampede Japanese business
men and politicians in calling for a'complete normali
zation of Sino-Japanese relations.
It was with both positive and negative aspects of
the problem in mind that Foreign Minister Gromyko
journeyed to Tokyo in January of 1972.

The visit by

the Soviet Foreign Minister had important implications,
both within and outside Japan and the Soviet union.

In

China, for example, an improvement in Soviet-Japanese
relations could only add fuel to the existing fears of
Russian encirclement.

Among the Gromyko discussions

designed to stimulate better relations with Japan, it
was "an open secret ~hat China had figured prominently in
the Soviet-Japanese talks."S

In addition, Grornyko was

reported to have warned the Japanese:
We wish you to have friendly relations in
China • • • But I think it should be done
without impairing relations with the
Soviet Union. 9
SnA New Move in the Great Power Game,n Newsweek,
February 7, 1972, p. 29.
9

.

Ib~d.
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The Soviet use of pressure and interference in .
Japanese political matters had long been a major sore
point in the relations between the two countries.

For

example, the,
Russians sent Deputy Prime Minister
Mikoyan to Japan in 1961 on a good
will mission. During his visit he
remarked that Japan would be well
advised not to renew the security
treaty with the United States. He
was told in no uncertain terms that
Japan would brook no interference in
its internal affairs, and after his
departure, Russia still ranked at
the bottom of all nations in Japan's
popularity poll.lO
In a second example, the Soviet government in
March of 1970 notified Japan that Soviet fleet units
would be holding-firing practice off the northern
coast of Japan.

Although aimed at China principally

and Japan only indirectly, the response from Japan was
so critical that the Soviets agreed to cancal both
operations. 11

The Japanese, in turn, have even insti

gated their own counterpressures.

For example, in

March of 1971 the Soviet media complained that three
Japanese fighter plans had buzzed a Soviet destroyer on
maneuvers off southern Japan. 12
10 Buss, p. 636.
11
. G1'bney, p. 108 •
l2see The New York Times, April 20, 1971, p. 5.
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Although today, Japan fears the Soviet Union
probably more than any oth,er. country in the world, the
Japanese know that their suspicions are valid only if
the Russians consider them an enemy.

Today, both

China and the Soviet Union compete against the other~
hoping to win Japan as an ally. 'Notunexpectedly, the
methods each uses to induce (or coerce) Japan, differs.
The Russians currently hold two major enticements (for
the purpose of bargaining with Japan):

the northern,

islands issue: and the natural resources of Siberia.
Given the choice, the Russians would choose to employ
the latter as a bargaining issue.

Among the, two al

ternatives, the Siberia offer has for the Soviet Union
the greatest potential rewards and the fewest dangers.
Moscow, in attempting to entice Japan with the
Siberian venture, would like from that country one
billion dollars in credit as part of a mutual invest
ment deal.

These funds would be used to help build a

proposed 4000-mile pipeline, expected to carry oil from
West Siberia near Tyumen, to the Pacific port of
Nahodka.

This, the Russians explain, would then provide

Japan with an annual flow of 50 million tons of high
grade oil.

For the Russians, in addition to the

othe~

concessions won from the Japanese, the agreement would
help to fulfill the ninth Soviet five-year economic
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plan, as well as to provide a ready supply of fuel to
the eastern coast of Siberia, enhancing Soviet navc.l
power in the Far East. 13
The major problems yet to be overcome by Japan
are associated with the footing of the proiect itself
(mostly at government expense).
Japa~ese

In addition, the

must erase the,

doubt which persists over becoming too
heavily dependent for such a vital source
of energy as oil from a totalitarian
government that could with a twist of the
spigot turn off the supply • • • it is
highly probable that the Russian deter
mination and haste in the proceeding with
this project are motivated at least in
part by their controversy with Peking •
.Japan would surely be ill-advised to get
caught in the middle of the Soviet
Chinese squabble. 14
Thus far, Japan and the Soviet Union have been
limited to concrete agreements in outlying areas only.
These agreements include the calling forth of Japanese
assistance for the development of several Soviet Far
Eastern ports, an agreement in 1967 providing for an
Arctic route along the northern coast of the Soviet
Union aiding transportation from Japan to Europe, and,
an agreement that allows Japan Air Lines, as the only
13The Japan Times, February 26, 1972, p. 14.
l4 Ibid •
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non-Socialist air line, to make regular flights over
Siberia to ~,10scow. 15
The Soview first offered the Siberian venture to
Japan in 1960.

Twelve years later, Japan had still not
f.'I'

,I ,

made a formal move toward' acceptance.

One reason for

the Japanese reluctance in consideration of the project
is the implications such an agreement would have for
the American-Japanese security aqreement, and also,
on Japan-China relations.

In regard to the latter,

the Japanese investment at Tyumen, so close to the
Chinese border, would mean a significant political in
vestment on the Russian side of the Sino-Soviet conflict.
The Nixon "shocks," however, have helped to push
Japan and the ,Soviet Union slowly and cautiously closer
towards reaching
tion.

~ome

agreement on the Siberian ques

The Soviet ambassador to Japan, Oleg 'A.

Troyanovsky, said in January of 1972, that the "Soviet
union does not need foreign help in the development of
Siberia" but any country is welcomed to share in the
exploitation of Siberian natural resources. 1116
Concerning the great potentials in Siberia,
Pravda ran a series of articles in March of 1972,
15Glaubitz, p. 36.
16The Japan Times Weekly, January 8, 1972, p. 2.
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detailing the need for new equipment and for the new
pipeline. 17

The article noted that when completed,

the new pipeline will carry millions of tons of Ob
petroleum to the East.

Perhaps as a warning to the

cautious Japanese, the article noted that, since the Ob
area and Alaska pose a good many common problems,
"American firms are displaying great interest in what
is being done along the Ob.,,18

Already, the daily

extraction of oil has reached the level of "148,000
tons."- The article concluded, pleading that the level
"cannot go even one ton higher!

Why?

Because the

existing pipelines are loaded to capacity.u19

What is

needed, of course, is money (yen).
Meetings between the two powers, which include
discussions on the Siberian project, continue.

For

example, from July 15 to July 27, 1971, a National
Council of Governors from Japan visited a variety of
industrial plants and state farms, including a discussion
in Moscow "of the status and further development of
l7Current Diqest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIV,
No. 10, April 5, 1972, pp. 1-6. (See also Pravda,
March 4, 5 and 9, 1972.)
l8 Ibid ., p. 1.
19 Ibid ., p. 2.
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cultural and economic ties and coastal trade between
East Siberia and Far Eastern territories and provinces
and Japanese prefectures. n20
From February 21 to February 24, 1972, a confer
ence of the Soviet-Japanese and

Japanese~Soviet

sions for Business Cooperation met in Tokyo.

Commis

The Soviets

proposed at the conference that Japan offer a bank-to
bank loan of at least one billion dollars, at an interest
rate of 6 percent a year, for the construction of the
trans-Siberian pipeline.

The Russian newspaper,

Izvestia, optimistically observed that this fifth
conference,
opens a new page in the history of the
development of economic relations between
the two countries •
there is complete
confidence now that the present projects
will be transformed into practical deeds,
because the plans discussed at the Tokyo
conference rest on sober-minded planning
and on the objective necessary of peace
ful coexistence betvleen the u. S. S. R. and
Japan and of mutually advantageous cooper
ation in the interests of the peop1esof
both countries. 21
Although, as yet, the fifth conference has pro
duced no hard and fast agreements on the Siberian in
vestment question, other joint projects were also

17.

20 Ibid ., Vol. XXIII, No. 30, August 24, 1971, p.
(See also Pravda, July 27, 1971, p. 2).

16.

21 Ibid ., Vol. XXIV, No.9. March 29. 1972, pp. 15
(See also Izvestia, March 1, 1972, p. 2.)
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considered.

For example, ,discussed were the mining of

coal in South Yakut l the

d~velopment

of oil and gas

resources on the continental Shelf of Sakhalin, the supply
of pulp wood through the port of Wrangel, and the ship
(,

'

ment of natural gas from Yakut.

".

The Siberian venture would,' of course, be pro
fitable to Japan for a number of reasons.

The expected

hiqh quality of oil from Tyumen would reduce Japan's
present major pollution problemi the sale of steel pipes
and construction equipment would help Japanese busi
nessesi other possible natural resources in Siberia
might be opened to further development by the
Japanesei and, with the opening of the Tyumen oil
deposits, Japan would no longer be forced to depend on
the Middle East.
Indicative of an important segment of

op~nion

in

Japan is Fumio Tanuka, president of the Oji Paper
Company and negotiator with the Soviet Union for the
pulp-e~ploitation

in Siberia.

Tanuka noted that lithe

Japanese economy can no longer depend solely on the
U.S. as heretofore," and predicted "the n.eed for
Russian-Japanese collaboration based upon the develop
ment of Siberia will increase steadily in the years
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ahead. 1122

Trade between Japan and the Soviet Union has,

in fact, shown steady growth.
Following the summer of 1966 and Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan, both sides have
since held regular consultations at the ministoral
level.

This has made Japan only the third nation with
which Moscow has made such an agreement. 23
In 1969. trade between the Soviet Union and Japan
totaled some $730 million.

In 1970, Japan replaced

Britain as Russia's top trading partner.
The same year saw Japanese trade vlith
Moscow reach an unprecedented $812 million
• • • This roughly equalled Japanese
trade with China-- though Moscow left a
surplus export balance while Peking im
ported much more than it exported. 24
This, however, also clearly points to a major problem
in Soviet trade with Japan, i.e., the Soviet Union (as
in the case of the United States), imports more from
I

Japan than it exportsR

At the same time, if Japan and

the Soviet union could reach an agreement on the Siberian
investment question, the result of Japan importinq
22 The Japan Times

Weekl~,

February 19, 1972, p. 4.

23 Gl
'
aub~tz,
p. 2 7 .
24Far Eastern Economic Review, March 20, 1971,
pp. 27-2a:- In contrast, U.S. trade with the Soviet
Union for the same year was only $177 million. See
The Japan Times, April 20, 1972, p. 17.
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resources from Russia, would go far in correcting the
imbalance of trade between the two countries.

In 1970,

the major area where Soviet exports to Japan indicated
a strong increase was in round timber (i.e., from
13,600,000 in 1969 to 15,300,000 in 1970).25
In an Izvestia article in January of 1972, Japan
was offered a "better deal" from the Socialist world
than the current one they were gettinq from "Nixon's
America."

Russian and Japanese tradeilvolume increased

even during the past year, despite the fact that 1971
was one of the most difficult years for the Japanese
economy in the entire postwar period."

In December,

a general agreement was signed on deliveries
from the U.S.S.R. to Japan of industrial
wood chips, and deciduous pulpwood logs,
etc. The importance, outside the obvious,
is that the Soviet Union is offerinq
Japan a stable economic relationship that
could replace in importance the one now
shared between Japan and Nixon's
America. 26
In this sense, the Soviet Union is not only attempting
to keep Japan and China apart, but the Russians are also
attempting to use the Nixon "shocks n as well as other
means, to lure Japan away from the United States.
25 Current D~gest 2f t h e Sov~et Press, Vo 1 • XXIII,
No. 28, August 10, 1971, p. 3.
0

16.

0

26 I bOd
~ ., Vo 1 . XXIV, No. 2 ,Fe b ruary 9, 1972, p.
(See also Izvestia, January 14, 1972, p. 2.)
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The most important items the Soviet union imports
from Japan are:

pulp and paper, machinery and equip

ment,
including complete sets of enterprises
for the chemical, pulp-and-paper, food,
forge and press equipment, machine tools
and instruments, as well as such indus
trial materials as rolled ferrour metal
and pipe, chemical products and other
goods. 27
In the past several years, there' has been a substantial
growth in Soviet buying of Japanese consumer goods and
raw materials.
Japan are

The most important Russian exports to

curre~tly

various types of fuel* raw minerals,

and industrial materials that include coal, petroleum
and petroleum salts, asbestos, nickel, aluminum, pig
iron, commercial timber, cotton and other goods. ' Late
ly, Soviet exports of machinery and equipment to Japan
have risen. 28
I

A Pravda article in late 1971 expressed hope that

Japan could develop the Far Eastern regions of the
U.S.S.R. wherein enormous deposits of fuels, power and
raw material wealth and industrial and agricultural
27
p. 1.

Ibid., Vol. XXIII, No. 42, November 16, '1971,
(See also Pravda, October 20, 1971, p. 5.)

28 Ibid •
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resources were concentrated. 29

Japan could make good

use of these materials, si.:nce 99 percent of their
petroleum and 100 percent of their lumber is imported.
The movement in Japan business and public
circles for the further,., development of
trade and economic ties with the Soviet
Union is explained by economic necessity
and corresponds to Japan's national in
terests • . • The first important steps
have already been taken.30
In 1968, the first general agreement had been con
cluded and "went beyond the framework of ordinary
conunercial transactions.,,31
In 1970, a second general agreement was con
cluded which declared the initiation of a cooperative
effort between the t,vo countries in designing a new
seaport at WrangeJ. Bay.

The new seaport is expected

to provide additional facilities in the handling of
the growing volume of trade between the Soviet Union
and Japan.

In addition, the agreement also called for

the construction of two new fishing ports in the Far
East:

.one in Troitsa Bay (Maritime Territory), and one

in Kholmsk (Sakhalin Province).

Moreover, a new five-

year trade agreement (1971-1975) was signed between the
29 Ibid •
30 Ibid .
3l Ibid .
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two countries, envisaging,a steady growth of exchange in
goods.
During 1971, over 20,000 Japanese tourists visited
the Soviet Union, while air'travel over Siberia from
Tokyo to Moscow developed a-c. a 'fairly rapid pace.
Large scale tourism, an Izvestia 'article claimed, nis
an important new factor making for rapprochement be
tween the peoples of the two countries.,,32

Following

the 1970 establishment ofttfraternal ties"between the
cities of Kiev and Kyoto, the number in 1971 was in
creased to nine.

There was a sharp increase in the

number of people studying Russian language in Japan.
There has been, also, expanded cultural and scientific
contact between the Soviet Union and Japan.

The arti

cle concluded, hinting the "only thing required for the
transformation of these possibilities into reality is
to eliminate the obstacles in the way of full
normalization

.. 33

Certain high-ranking elements within the Sato
Government favored shifting the country's ties from the
United States to the Soviet Union.

p. 17.

For example, it was

32 Ibid ., Vol. XXIV, No.2, February 9, 1972,
(See also Izvestia, January 14, 1972, p. 2.)

~3Ibid., p. 18.
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reported in September of 1971 in an interview with the
newspaper Asahi, that Japapese Aqriculture and
Forestry Minister Agaki had come out in favor of im
provinq relations with the Soviet Union, rather than
"dancing to the U.S.A.'s tune • • • ,,34

The means

for the improvement in relations was to be found
through the joint development of Siberia.

By broach

ing "Japanese-American relations in that same interview,
the Minister expressed dissatisfaction with Washington's
latest measures, which are seriously damaging Japan's
. .~nteres ts.
" 35

econom~c

The most important problem with the Soviet Union
at Japanese insistence, is the northern territories issue.
Since the Soviet Itcapture" of Southern Sakhalin and the
entire Kurlie Island chain in 1945, every Government of
Japan has insisted that the entire territory is not
Russian.

The refusal of Moscow to comply in some form

with the Japanese complaints has been a source of irri
tation. between the t'tvO countries.

The reversion of

Okinawa by the United States on May IS, 1972, has only
exposed and irritated the problem further.
until

p. 19.

t~e

Nixon-China "shock,n the Russians had

34 Ibid ., Vol. XXIII, No. 35, September 28, 19.71,
-
35 Ibid •
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even refused to discuss the problem with Japan.

In

April of 1970, with Soviet President Podgorny schenuled
shortly to visit Japan,
Kawashima Shohiro, Vice President of the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party, went to
Moscow, intending to hold unofficial talks
on the Northern Islands with Premier
Aleksei Kosygin. The Soviets, however,
rebuffed this Japanese initiative. Due to
illness, President Podgorny's visit was
cancelled, and Kosygin was unable to
receive Kawashima. 36
What the Japanese have lacked in success on the
northern territories issue they have made up on deter
mination.

While the Sato Government had asked for the

four southernmost islands only, the Japanese Communist
Party and the Japanese Socialist Party had requested
the return of the entire Kuriles chain.
The JCP's maxi demand, of course, is
prompted by its continuing feud with
the Soviet leadership over the inter
ference in the Japanese party's internal
affairs, as well as the knowledge that
the territorial issue is supported by a
broad segment of the Japanese people. 37
The Japanese have made the return of the islands a
precondition for the signing of a peace treaty; while the
Russians fear that a territorial concession with Japan
might lead other countries, such as Rumania and China,
36weinstein. p. 198.
37 Far Eastern Economic Review, December -4, 1971,

p. 12.
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to clamor for similar consideration.
The real problem centers not on the two nearest
and smallest islands, Habomai and Shikotan, which the
Soviets have made known for some time could be the
subject of serious discussion.

The problem is rather

the two largest islands of Kunashin arid Etorofu, on which
the Soviet position has been unyielding.

The Japanese,

on their side, have committed themselves
to a firm official stand in their demand
for their return. Maps in Japan nowadays
do not show the national boundary as separ
ating Hokkaido from Kunashiri but put the
dotted line between Etorofu and the Kurlie
Island immediately to the north of it • • •
The recovery of these northern islands,
then, must be regarded as a basic. if
long-term aim of Japanese foreign policy:
an option, in other words, that a Japanese
Government is not likely to forego. 38
Today almost no Japanese live in the northern
territories since most were evacuated in 1945 to the
mainland prior to Russian
occupation.
,

The chief victims

of the territorial problem has been the Japanese fisher
men of eastern Hokkaido.

It is they who. from 1946

through 1970. have had 1336 fishing boats seized, 11,316
crew members captured,39 22 boats sunk, and 32 lives
38

storry, pp. 331-332.

39 with the Soviet goodvlill-offensive highlighted
by the visit of Foreign r·1inister Andrei Gromyko to Japan
in January of 1972, 14 Japanese fishermen in a good-will
gesture were released from Soviet custody.
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. t ac t '10ns. 40
1 ost f rom h Ost1'I e SOV1e
Another major problem associated with the return
of the northern territories is that, should the islands
become Japanese territory, such an action would, in a
sense, "open the doorn·to the'Sea of Okhotsk, nowal
most considered a "Russian lake.'"

The loss by Russia to

the Japanese would be strategic, and vlould allovl
greater claim by Japan against the Russian-attempted
conservation of the fishing resources in the once-rich
Okhotsk shoal.

Reports from the Russian press have in

dicated the importance attached to this area and the
resentment of even present Japanese activities.

The

"conunercial value of the Sakhalin-Hokkaido shoal was
almost destroyed . • • because the Japanese conunercial
fisheries persisted in taking undersized herring from
41
the already depleted shoal."
Now, the Iflast remaining
herring reserve, the Okhotsk shoal, is directly threat
ened as a result of the stand the Japanese have taken.,,42
For this reason, among others, the Russians have
taken a strong stand on the northern islands issue.

An

40 The New York Times, January 12, 1971, p. 2.
41current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIII,
No. 15, May 11, 1971, p-.-3g:
42 Ibid •
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article in Izvestia, in January of 1971. detailed the
motivated s'trength of the Soviet stand,arguing the
Japanese "revanchist motto of 'struggle for the islands.

'II

are rooted:
in the general trend of 'balancing economic'
potential and military power,'. which has be
come the 'idee-fixe' of Japan's mi1itary
indus tr ia1 complex • . . in attempting to
whip up a militarist and revanchist frenzy
in their country, the leaders of the Liberal
Democratic Party are clearly losing their
sense of reality . • • it is an unquestion
able fact that the actions of certain
Japanese circles in attempting to revise
the result of the Second World War are
creating a serious obstacle (to peace.).43
The above article was accompanied by another, five
days later, in, Pravda.

Japan, the article complained,

was making "brazen territorial claims," and developments:
have shown that the heightened militarization
of Japan, directly threatens the people of
Asia and the Japanese people themselves •
It would be advisable for the soldiers of
fortune in thet Far East to take a rook at
the calendar and assure themselves that they
are no longer living in the 1930 l s . • • 44
In September, Pravda, in another among numerous
articles, laid even greater stress on the territorial
issue by dropping of the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima.
43 Ibid ., Vol. XXIII, No.4, February 23, 1971,
p. 20 • . (Also, see Izvestia, January 26, 1971, p. 2.)
29.

44 Ibid ., Vol. XXIII, No. 5,March 2, 1971, pp. 28
(See also Pravda, January 31, 1971, pp. 1 and 4.)
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The article asked, why?
Was it simply the length of time that had
passed since the bombing? No, the cause
lies not only in the time that has passed
but also in the policies of certain cir
cles that are striving to make people
forget Hiroshima . • • The Japanese revenge
seekers try to 'justify' their claims to a
part of Soviet territory mainly on two
counts: that what they call Japan's
'northern territories' had always belonged
to her, and that their future had allegedly
not been finally decided by international
agreements, including those signed by
Japan. 45
To answer these claims, Pravda continued:

"facts

and documents" concerning the issue of the ownership of
the Kurile Islands,
incontrovertibly testify that long before
the first Japanese made their appearance
on the Kuriles, the islands had already
been discovered, explored and settled by
the Russians, and had become a part of the
territory of Russia by right of discovery •
• • The point is that the men in Tokyo have
'forgotten' the unconditional surrender, the
wartime and postwar agreements, which laid
down how and what Japan would have to pay
for her policy of militarism and aqqression,
which had inflicted so manycalamitieson the
peoples of Asia. 46
While the Russian argument is correct, it is
neither totally nor geographically germane to the issue.
In 1875, the southern half of Sakhalin was ceeded to
45S • Budkevich and M. Raginsky. "The Tokyo Trial:
A Reminder," International Affairs (August 1971), pp.
76-77.
46 Ibid •
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Russia in exchange for the Kuriles (in the Treaty of
St. Petersburg).

Following the conclusion of the

Russo-Japan War in 1905 (and the Treaty of Portsmouth) ,
Japan kept the Kuriles Islands while taking back the
southern part of Sakhalin.

However, the Kurile Islands

that Japan had won and held from 1875 to 1945 did not
include the four southern islands that the Japanese and
Russians dispute today.

The two southernmost and

smallest islands (Habomai and Shikotan), were, until
1945, Japanese throuqh exploration and settlement from
the early days.

The Russians have for some time shown

interest in returning these two islands.

The Soviets,

however, have refused to discuss the return of the two
larger islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu.

Both of these

islands have also been Japanese since the early days,
and were confirmed to Japan by the Treaty of Shimada
in 1855.
Although Japan's claim to each of the four is
lands may seem equally valid, the Russians have con
tended that,
it is the Japanese side that has for many
years frustrated the conclusion of a peace
treaty with the U.S.S.R., seeking to sub
stitute a discussion of the long settled
'territorial issue' for talks about a peace
treaty. The Japanese government has made
·no secret of the fact that it does not want
a real peace treaty, but a 'peace treaty on
the basis of a return of the northern
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territories.' This stand of the Japanese
ruling circles clashes sharply with the
urge of the peoples for a relaxation of .
international tension and does nothing at
all to promote the normalization of rela
tions with the Soviet Union. 47
The six-day visit by Foreiqn Minister Gromyko to
Japan in January of 1972 was an indication of a modera
ting position on the Russians side.

As part of the good

will-offensive, Gromyko's visit was designed to probe
Japan's intentions following the problems raised by the
U.S.-China rapprochement.

At the same time that Gromyko

was attempting to take advantage of recent JapanAmerican conflicts, China

~vas

using the northern terri

tories issue to its own advantage.

According to a

report in Asahi Shinbun (a leading Japanese newspaper),
Chinese Premier Chou En-lai told a visiting- Japanese
delegation that "the reversion of the northern territor
ies has not yet been decided, but we support the return
demands of the Japanese people. ,,48
The major impact thus far from the Soviet qood
will-offensive was felt in late January of 1972.

Follow

ing a series of talks by Sato and Gromyko, it was agreed
that the two countries would study conditions prerequisite
47 Ibid ., pp. 70 and 107.
48
. The New York Times, January 24, 1972, p. 9.

167
to the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty,
"which informed sources said included the northern
territorial problem. n49

Elimination of the northern

territories as an issue would eliminate the major
problem currently standing in the way to complete
normalization of relations.
The impetus upon the Soviet Union from the U.S.
China "detente" and the shifts of attitudes in Japan,
have brought about a sudden improvement in RussoJapanese relations unexceeded in the post-war period.
The 1972 Gromyko visit to Japan also produced additional
agreements; Foreign Minister Gromyko and Prime Minister
Sato agreed to an exchange of visits by the Soviet and
JapanesePrime Ministers; Gromyko and Foreign Minister
Fukuda approved a cultural agreement and made plans to
negotiate a scientific and technological pact; a
further expansion of the already growing and important
trade relations would be explored; the fourteen Japanese
fishermen then being held by Soviet authorities would be
released: and most important, of course, was the pledge
to begin talks within the year designed to produce a
signing of a formal peace treaty ending World War II. 50
49 The Japan Times Weekly, January 29, 1972, p. 1.
50
The Japan Times, January 28, 1972, p. 12.
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The latter statement indicated an improvement in the
possibilities of solving the northern islands issue,
and indicated flexibility on the part of both sides to
compromise.

Moreover, the Soviets no longer demand a

complete Japanese abrogation of defense ties with the
United States as a pre-condition to peace talks.

This

new Russian attitude is indicative of the deterioration,
in their opinion, of the significance of the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty.

In February of 1972, with the conclu

sion of the Gromyko visit, Prime Minister Sato was forced
in the Diet to defend his foreign policy; declaring he
would not renounce the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in
return for a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

Sato

was rebutting the argument advanced by the chairman
of the Japan Socialist Party.

The latter wanted the

Government, to negotiate a return of all the Kuri1e
Islands to Japan with the Soviet Union in return for the
abrogation of the Japan-U.S. treaty.51
However, the signing of the peace treaty with the
Soviet Union will not end all the current problems ex
isting between the two countries.

The bad feelings

that exist are due not only from Russian actions late in
51The Japan Times, February 5, 1972, p.2.
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the Second World War, but also are due from the bad
feelings that have evolved in Russia from Japan's
foreign policy in the last few years.

More specifically,

Soviet commentators have recently attacked the
Japanese role in Vietnam for their production of war
materials, in allowing the use of Japan's ports for
the servicing and refueling of United States' warships,
and in the diplomatic support given Washington by the
Japanese Government of Sato.

In addition, X-1oscow

has chastised the past Japanese Government for the
support given American flintrigues" against the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, as well as the signing by
Japan of the treaty which normalized relations with the
Republic of Korea.

In fact, at one time,

Soviet propagandists had gone so far as to
postulate collaboration between Tokyo and
Bonn toward reviving the World War II align
ment. The visit by the Chancellor Kurt
Kiesinger to Tokyo in l1ay of 1969 provided
a field day for the Soviet press • • • 52
One Soviet observer, writing in Pravda, saw the
question of Soviet-Japan relations for the future is
essentially a flpolitical struggle," flaring:
5Mar~an
2.
P.

.
h"
·
K~rsc,
Sov~et

.
Secur~ty

·
0 b·Ject~ves
in Asia," International Organization, Vol. XXIV, No~
3 (Summer 1970), p. 459.
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over the path that Japan will be traversing
in the years to come _ '~lill Japan continue
to follow a course of military cooperation
with the U.S.A., fraught with the constant
threat of being pulled into the adventures
of U_S _ imperialism, or vvill Japan free i t
self from the fetters of its military al
liance with the Pentagon and settle firmly
on a course of peaceful development and co
operation with all countries and peoples.53
In other words, will Japan in the years to come continue
to follow a course of association with the United States,
or will Japan in the future come to depend more heavily
on the Soviet Union, China, or even exclusively on
Japan itself?

This is a question that to a great ex

tent will be eventually answered by the after-effects
of the Nixon "shocks."
CONCLUSION
The period from 1969 to 1972 was critical for
the development of Japan's foreign policy_

In that

period, Japan evolved from a role as an indistinct
shadow, mimicking the American image in foreign policy,
to the role of a quasi-independent Asian Great Power.
After 20 years as the junior American partner in ASia,
Japan had been jolted by a series of Nixon "shocks.1I
53The Current Digest- of the Soviet Press, Vol,.
XXIII. N0:-47. December 21,1971, P. 25. (See also
Pravda.. November 23,1 g71 •. 1'-- t).)
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Although U.S.-Japanese

rt~lations

had been dete

iorating prior to 1972, the Nixon ushockstt 'Nent far
in providing the stimulus necessary for improving
Sino-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations.

At a

time when the ties between .Am~r'i:can and Japan are "at
their weakest point in the poit-0~r period, both
China and the Soviet Union compete for the security
that an alliance with Japan would provide.

To a very

great degree, the future course of Japan1s foreign
policy \,/ill

_~ave

of power in Asia.

a tremendous impact on the balance
The Government of Prime Minister

Tanaka is aware that 2.ny reduction of confidence with
the United States in the security treaty must mean

ill1

increased dependence on some other Great Power, i.e.,
China or the Soviet Union; or on Japan itself.
A question of primary importance to all of the
nations in Asia concerns the degree to vvhich Japan
might in the fu -cure I'earro..

Tb.e trsLlendous growth of

Japan 1 s post-war economy allOYls for and necE?ssi tates
increased poli tical, and even perhaps, L1i1i tar,7 respon
sibilities.

In general, it can be expected that Japan

-;'Jill remilitariz8

;~.t

a proportional extent to which

confidence has been lost in the reliability of the
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American security alliance.
Finally, to a large degree, while the Soviet
Union and China compete to draw Japan, at this propi
tious

moment~

further away from its American ally, the

United States finds itself also with a delicate task
in Japan: to revivify and solidify those remaining
ties of goodwill that exist between American and its
"most important ally in Asia.

tI
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